On 30 Sep 2012, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/30/2012 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2012, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2012 7:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here
and now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a particular first
person comp indeterminacy.
Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a
physical world.
Perhaps, but you need to define what you mean by physical world
without assuming a *primitive* physical world.
Physical objects are exactly the kind of thing that are defined
ostensively.
They are referred too ostensively. They are not "defined" in that
way, at least not in the theory.
Well of course, nothing can be referred to ostensively *in a
theory*. But that's how theoretical definitions are given meaning
via reference to what we perceive.
Sure. But the meaning can be clean from metaphysical prejudices also.
Only in practice, they referred too ostensively. In our context, we
search a theory, not a practice.
A theory that can't be connected to practice is just abstract
mathematics, a kind of language game.
I can' agree more, and that is why I criticize physicalism (not
physics), as it cut the possible link between conscious practice and
theory.
Keep in my that my goal is to explain the origin of matter and
consciousness.
In fact you do connect your theory to practice by reference to
diaries and perceptions.
Absolutely so.
But I use the "yes doctor" practice, to still illustrate a conceptual
point, which is that if comp is true, the mind is basically solved by
the "dreams of the universal numbers", and matter is an open problem,
as we have only the dreams and the persistence of laws might seem more
difficult. The math just shows that the more we try to refute comp by
that problem, the more we get a quantum like weirdness, making perhaps
the quantum aspect of nature a reflect of our universal number dreamy
nature.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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