Yes, but it is also in its infancy. With Aczel's work not 30 years old, and
this admittedly weak analogy to consciousness only a few years old, which
Aczel does not seem to be following up on himself:

http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~petera/papers.html

My point is, this is very young, what's young is always messy and will
hopefully tidy itself up, and I can feel some funky aspect, specifically
the observer aspect of a non-well-founded set defining a Russell operator,
hinting at quantum physics perhaps in the future.

It should be called the Cantor operator, but as Zuckerman notes: "the
importance of PR and publishing makes the difference." So, knowing this,
why doesn't he call it the Cantor operator...

m

On Sat, Oct 6, 2012 at 9:12 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 06 Oct 2012, at 02:37, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>  Hi Folks,
>
>
>
>  http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0810/0810.4339.pdf
>
> Mathematical Foundations of Consciousness
> Willard L. Miranker<http://arxiv.org/find/math/1/au:+Miranker_W/0/1/0/all/0/1>
> , Gregg J. 
> Zuckerman<http://arxiv.org/find/math/1/au:+Zuckerman_G/0/1/0/all/0/1>
> (Submitted on 23 Oct 2008)
>
> We employ the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms that characterize sets as
> mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role
> in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for
> the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms motivates Platonic
> interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions
> for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings
> that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is
> developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of
> non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of
> consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system
> that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new
> axioms proceed through characterization of so- called consciousness
> operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one
> example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking
> examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate
> associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we
> show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the
> brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying
> appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.
>
>
>     This is part of what I have been assuming form the beginning of my
> conversation with Bruno so many moons ago. Its nice to see its independent
> discovery.
>
>
>
> As the cow-boy guessed right this is assuming too much, both for the
> formalism used (which is OK), and the ontology, so it uses implicitly
> non-comp hypothesis, which is less OK, as comp is also assumed implicitly.
> IT is not uninteresting for possible progress, but it is unaware that
> matter as to be explained by statistics on computations "seen from inside".
> The role of "Russell operator" is played by the Kleene second recursion
> theorem, which encapsulates the "non foundation" well enough.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
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