Brent
On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
> I agree.
>
> is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia?
It�s
> less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of
paper
> than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the
circle
> can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that
they
> produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the
> question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and
> others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more
> basic form of processing and the color processing is more
complicated?
> O is because shape and position processing evolved to be
communicable
> quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary
> pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ?
>
> If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the
opposite.
> Instead of �what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the
question
> is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist
> stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the
> perception that I have a head with a brain?
>
> 2012/10/25 Roger Clough<rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>:
>> Dennett and others on qualia
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett
>>
>> 1) Schroedinger on qualia.
>>
>> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of
wine, the
experience of taking a recreational drug,
>> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett
writes that
qualia is "an unfamiliar term for
>> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways
things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr�dinger,
>> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The
sensation
of colour cannot be accounted for by
>> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the
physiologist account for it, if he had fuller
>> knowledge than he has of the processes in
>> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the
optical
nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2]
>>
>> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely
from the
fact that they are seen as posing a
>> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body
problem. Much of the debate over their
>> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used,
>> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of
certain
features of qualia. As such,
>> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
>>
>>
>> 2) Dennett on qualia
>>
>> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),
[19]
Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to
>> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to
make a
practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments,
>> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the
world of
neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological
experimentation.
>> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia
is so
imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the
>> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the
introduction
of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special
>> properties defined for qualia."
>>
>> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially
says
>> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them.
>>
>>
>> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what
they are,
but what they do..
>> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above,
>>
>> The "What's it like to be?" argument
>> Main article: Subjective character of experience
>>
>> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas
Nagel's
>> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates
over
qualia.
>> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective
character, a
>> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious
mental states if and only i
>> if there is something that it is like to be that organism �
something
it is like for the organism."
>>
>> Nagel also suggests that the subjective
>> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for
by the
objective methods of
>> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we
acknowledge that a physical theory of mind
>> must account for the subjective character of experience, we
must
admit that no presently
>> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6]
Furthermore, he states that
>> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be
contemplated
>> until more thought has been given to the general problem of
subjective
and objective."[6]
>>
>> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given)
>>
>> The zombie argument
>> Main article: Philosophical zombie
>>
>> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there
could be
physical duplicates of people,
>> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies"
would
demonstrate outward behavior
>> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a
subjective phenomenology.
>> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the
possibility of
philosophical zombies is that
>> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly
give rise
to qualia�the zombie can only
>> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the
physical brain."
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>
>> 10/25/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
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>
>
