On 10/30/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net 
<mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

    On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote:

    On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
    My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply 
only to
    the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves.

    Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some
    machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.

    So your are agreeing?  "Two" has no truth value, but "Two equals one plus 
one." does.

    Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot.
    But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that 
the truth
    of, say  "Two equals one plus one." depend on some numbers or subject 
having to
    discover it, or prove it.

    Bruno

    http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>


    Dear Bruno,

        My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological 
primitive
    *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such 
as 2 =
    1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same 
meaning because
    there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on 
the truth
    value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of 
any
    particular entity capable of "understanding" the statement, there is no 
meaning to
    the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement 
has a
    meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no 
entities capable
    of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness!
       You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow.


Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio).

I don't see why denying mathematical realism would entail saying no to the doctor. The doctor isn't proposing to replace part of you brain with a piece of Platonia, he has a real physical device to implant.

Brent

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