Roger says "that mind and body are completely contrary substances"
Richard replies "what is dualism if not that?" On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > Hi Craig Weinberg > > The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take > them too seriously. > > But keep in mind: > > IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid. > Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable > issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances, > and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem. > > Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith > body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists > hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense, > and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 11/5/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Craig Weinberg > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41 > Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p > > > > > On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. > > So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not > shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? > > You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless > substance dualism is true. > > > The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an > infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect > monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain in > some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and external > in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. > > Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are literally > internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that your brain > is identical to you. It has to be a two way street. > > It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of the > phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like saying > that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It is not > true. Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each other, > and the pixels are there to help tell that storytelling. > > This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as > human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal > non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which is > driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side of > the 'genuine leader'. > > > > > > > You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular > configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that > configuration is determined by physical factors. > > The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's what I > am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as a one way > street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water is ice but > ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in my brain, > then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an event in the > universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and see. You could > say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok too, but you think > it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical reality of the molecules > themselves. I am saying that there is no independent groupiness... it is a > fantasy. Incorrect. > > > That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is > eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism. > > No, your view has it upside down. The mindset which generates that view is so > absolutely biased that it cannot conceive of turning this simple picture > right side up. > > If something looks like particles moving on the outside but feels like > remembering a fishing trip on the inside, that doesn't mean that the memory > is the epiphenomenon. The memory is the whole point of the particles. They > have nothing else to do sitting in your skull but to provide the grunt work > of organizing your access to your own human experiences. > > It is not eliminative materialism to say that object and subject are the same > thing from different views, it is dual aspect monism. When I say 'there are > two sides to this coin', your mind keeps responding 'but coins are tails'. He > keeps looking at the universe from an external perspective and then > projecting that world of objects-within-objects as some kind of explanation > of the subject who he actually is. My view is that it cannot work that way. > > In any case, the behaviour of the molecules is entirely consistent with > chemistry. An ion channel opens because it changes conformation due to > neurotransmitters binding to it or the transmembrane voltage. Any > subjectivity it may have does not enter into the equation. > > What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story, > just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other > half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any more > than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas. Two > opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public space > juxtaposition. > > > That may be, but the molecules *entirely* determine the behaviour of the > brain. > > When I say the words "bright blue liquid" I have changed the behavior of the > molecules of your brain *entirely*. It was not anything but my intention to > write these words to you which made that change. Your brain, it's neurons and > molecules dutifully *follow* my commands from across the internet with no > biochemistry connecting us whatsoever. The reasoning you are using is > circular and disconnected from reality. It makes sense, and again I used to > believe what you believe for many years, but I understand clearly now why it > fails to describe the ordinary reality we experience. > > > If you know chemistry and you know what molecule is where, you know what > chemical reactions will occur, and if you know that you know how the person > is going to move. You don't know about the person's subjectivity, but you do > know about his behaviour. > > > Your view can't explain how chemistry knows what "bright blue liquid" means > and why it cares. Your view can't explain how or why anything 'means' > anything. > > > > My phone has a one year guarantee, so that it if it fails and can't be > repaired Apple will replace it with an identical phone. Are they opening > themselves up to legal challenge if this is ontologically impossible? > > I would imagine that their legal department has defined 'identical' in a > commercially feasible way. They can probably send you a phone with similar > but not identical parts even. If you look at the serial numbers in your > replacement phone, you will readily see that identical is not to be taken > absolutely literally. 'Similar enough for you' is what they mean. > > That is the sort of identity I am interested in if the phone is to be > replaced: if it is different in some way I can't detect in normal use I don't > care. Similarly if I were to have parts of my body replaced: if I can't tell > any difference after a few days, that's good enough for me. > > > You don't care, but the universe does. You cannot be replaced. Parts of you > can be removed and what remains of you can learn to use substitutes, but > there has to be enough of you left to use anything. You can't amputate your > head and replace it with a mannequin and expect 'you' yourself to survive. > > Craig > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/_YTMxn06OssJ. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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