Hi Russell Standish Consciousness and intelligence, not just consciousness. A cave man had to determine if a twig lying on the ground is a snake or a twig.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/12/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-10, 23:00:23 Subject: Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible? On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: > On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > >I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain) > >is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an > >anti-solipsism requirement. > > But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP? > Is it just an anthropic selection argument? > > Brent > I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something like: 1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness 2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler." 3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation, that evolution is the only creative (or information generating) process. 4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically, you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and consequently intersubjectivity. Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint. 1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1) being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!). Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.