On 23 Nov 2012, at 18:14, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Actually in effect I asked 2 questions:
1) It was a little unclear to me what actually took place.
I was thinking regarding UD1 that what was reconstituted in Helsinki
was the computer program, which could be sent as a data file
over the internet, while the real fleshly you
remained behind in brussells. Are you saying instead that
the fleshly you would appear instead at helsinki ?
How was it teleported ?
This depends on the level used in the doctor assumption. If the level
is high, we can scan your brain here, destroyed the body, send the
information to Helsinki, and build you there a new body with a
computer in the skull, in which we encoded the information scanned.
if the level is low, we have just to send much more information in
Helsinki, where you will be reconstituted accordingly. In all case the
original brain or body is destroyed, and you are supposed to be
reconstituted at the correct level.
2) So my thinking was that from that point on, any initiative
had to be made by the computer program.
Yes. that computer program is supposed to be the software of your new
brain there. But the distinction software/hardware is not really
relevant and depends on the comp substitution level.
I guess I could simply ask the question that I had posed with
the ass as
Does the flesh tell the computer program what to do or
does the initiative come from the computer program ?
The flesh can say something, it has just to be interfaced correctly
with the artificial brain. If the flesh play some role in the
computation supporting my mind, it can be considered as part of the
(generalized brain) and the scanning device has to take this into
account.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-23, 12:42:43
Subject: Re: The Buridan's Ass or the What's next ? problem after
teleportation
On 23 Nov 2012, at 13:18, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno:
At least one objection to UD(1) of mine is this problem:
Buridan's ass is an illustration of a paradox in philosophy in the
conception of free will.
It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass that is
equally hungry and thirsty is placed precisely midway
between a stack of hay and a pail of water. Since the paradox
assumes the ass will always go to whichever is closer,
it will die of both hunger and thirst since it cannot make any
rational decision to choose one over the other.[1]
The paradox is named after the 14th century French philosopher Jean
Buridan, whose philosophy of moral determinism it satirizes.
A common variant of the paradox substitutes two identical piles of
hay for the hay and water; the ass, unable to choose between the
two, dies of hunger.
You lost me completely here, Roger. I don't see the relation with
the UD step 0 or 1. At all.
If you think the Buridan problem is a problem for comp, it means you
think to a very bad implementation. A robot or a sensible being will
just not get hungry if there is some food nearby. he might hesitate
a few second, then make an arbitrary choice, still determinist in
the eyes of God, and free in the mind of the ass.
Competing conflict are easily solve, by using pseudo-random
algorithm, or because the probability that you are exactly divided
by alternative does not make sense.
Buridan ass does not exist, and if it arises, natural selection will
quickly prune it of the species tree.
In fact life is easily cruel with those who decide too much slowly.
It is too much good for the predators.
Bruno
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Bruno Marchal
The problem is very basic and concerns at least UD(1).
I would call it the "what's next" problem.
Suppose you say yes, doctor and then wake up after the
transplant of a computer for your brain. Everything feels
fine, there is is no problem to solve, you have no immediate goal,
so what do you do next ?
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-22, 10:09:27
Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence
Hi Roger,
On 22 Nov 2012, at 13:57, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno
Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence
between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with
the computer in order for comp to hold ?
You don't need a "perfect" correspondence. What would that mean?
Even a brain has to make a lot of approximate representations all
of the time, and to correct many error through redundant neuronal
circuitry.
But that would require the computer to know the future.
Hence comp is false.
You seem to be quite quick. I am not sure I see your point at all.
For comp being false, you need to postulate that there are some
activities which are not Turing emulable in the body, but up to now
everything in nature seems to be based on computable (Turing
emulable) laws (except the wave packet reduction, which is itself
quite a speculation).
Have you try to read the UD argument? Are you OK with the
definition of comp, and step 1?
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/22/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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