On 14 Dec 2012, at 22:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/14/2012 5:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Dec 2012, at 16:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
My prejudice is that the projection from dreams of the mind is
to a
unique physical universe rather than every possible one.
On the contrary. It leads to many-dreams, and it is an open
question if this
leads to a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a multi-multi-
multiverse,
etc.
Is CTM
capable of such a projection even if it is not Occam?
CTM predicts it a priori. And it is OCCAM, in the sense that it
is the
simplest conceptual theory (just addition and multiplication of
non negative
integers).
Bruno, I presume here you mean that CTM predicts many dreams a
priori.
OK. Many dreams, and the feeling to belong to only one dream/reality.
Dear Bruno,
You still do not see that to 'make sense' (yes, Craig's term!)
of what you are saying, we have to take a complementary view. On one
hand we have the imaginary "god's view" where All is One,
With the CTM, arithmetic is enough. I don't think it is imaginary.
and on the other hand we have the finite observer's actual view of
"there are many that I can see".
That is what is made precise in the TOE *derived* from the CTM.
Is the projection to one SWI universe and/or multiple MWI universes
also predicted a priori?
Yes. From the first person perspective. It predicts also the trace
of the "many" (dreams/realities/worlds) once we look below our comp
substitution level.
The projection is no magic: it is like in the Moscow/Washington
duplication. Once the copies open the reconstitution boxes, they
can only observe Moscow OR Washington---exclusive OR.
My concern is that consciousness is
predicted at the many dreams stage before projection and that
consciousness could decide (a risky term) on a single SWI physical
universe with quantum probability.
Well, CTM predicts this, but with the CTM probabilities, which are
not yet well computed. If they differ from the QM probabilities,
this would make CTM in difficulties.
Does not this cry out for a discussion of the differences
between probabilities and actualities?
Not just a discussion, but an entire mathematical treatment, which has
been done.
In other words, the realm of "many dreams" contains all possible
eigenfunctions at various amplitudes. But in my view, if all
eigenfunctions become real in different physical worlds, the
amplitude
information is lost despite Deutsch's "measure" argument. That is,
amplitude information is only conserved as frequency of events in a
single physical world integrated over many trials. For Deutsch's
argument to be correct the same "many worlds" eigenfunctions must
exist in every universe of the multiverse, which in my mind makes
the
MWI multiverse an illusion.
The "many-worlds" eigenfunctions can be addressed with the
frequency operator of Graham, Preskill, and are indeed the same in
all universe, even in the Harry Potter universe.
Are not Harry Potter properties, properties that are mutually
inconsistent?
Not necessarily.
QM is invariant in the multiverse.
What does this mean, exactly?
That the SWE and the Born rules applies everywhere, even in the Harry
Potter universes, where it seems to not apply.
Even if I find myself in a Harry Potter universe where I saw a
billions particle in the 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) all the time being
up, I have to bet on 1/2 for the next one.
One thing that I would like to point out. We should not assume
'perfect information' of the ensemble of universes! Statistics are
often interpreted as if the sample is a perfect representation of
the ensemble. I see this as assuming a 'god's eye view' of all of
the members of the ensemble that can: 1) simultaneously access all
of the members and 2) compare them to each other instantly. This
idea is a complete fantasy!
Not in the CTM where you can use the math to make it precise.
Everett already show that such relative probabilities does not
depend on the choice of the basis, nor on my "place" in the
multiverse.
I strongly disagree with this statement! Everett showed the
exact opposite; that relative probabilities completely depend of the
choice of basis and framing.
Prove? This is contrary to what Everett said, and I have try to
contradict him on this, eventually he is right. Deustch tought like
you but has eventually change its mind. There are no prefer basis, and
with the CTM there are not even a prefer ontological theory.
The main message of QM, how ever you may wish to interpret it is
that there does not exist a preferred basis.
That's my point. Especially without collapse.
There are very strong number theoretic arguments that the every idea
of a relative measure cannot exist in the absence of the selection
of a particular basis and framing (aka 'point of view').
Of course, that is why the state is relative, but you can describe the
coupling observer+object in any base.
Bruno
With CTM you can say that the multiverse is an illusion: only (N,
+, *) is real, and the multiverse itself is a construct of the mind
of numbers to figure out the local arithmetical reality. But then
the moon is also an illusion.
Sure, it is an illusion, but it an illusion that we can all
agree upon and thus behave as if it where not.
There might also be clusters of different multiverses. We are only
at the beginning of the exploration of arithmetic.
Indeed! You need to consider the idea that arithmetic can encode
multiverses that are not composable into single Boolean
representations. Have you any experience with the work that is
required to "debug" a computer program? Given the set of all
possible computer programs, how does one consider whether or not a
pair of programs are bisimilar?
"In theoretical computer science a bisimulation is a binary relation
between state transition systems, associating systems which behave
in the same way in the sense that one system simulates the other and
vice-versa. Intuitively two systems are bisimilar if they match each
other's moves. In this sense, each of the systems cannot be
distinguished from the other by an observer."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bisimulation
--
Onward!
Stephen
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