On 26 Dec 2012, at 21:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/26/2012 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

John,

On 24 Dec 2012, at 21:16, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno and Brent:

we T H I N K we have an idea what 'qualia' may be and ACCEPT our figment on 'quanta' (i.e numbered 'objects' - figments as well). None of the two(?) are closer to the essence (read: 'truth') we just got better used (evolved?) to quantitative thinking and language concerning such because it seemed simpler to follow in primitive life.

But there are tools in math to handle qualities too, like modal logic.

Such tools cannot create qualia, nor perhaps explain them completely, but Earth Geography cannot create Earth, nor explain it completely, and is still useful.



Now, with Bruno's highly developed apparatus in arithmetics, quanta (numbers!) look like a 'reality' as compared to our still flimsy ideas about other qualia. Yet qualia they are (in a quantizing sense)
Language development went in parallel with a mental development.
This asymmetry may be the base for Bruno's:
"No qualia are communicable in the sense that quanta, or numbers, are communicable."
No OTHER qualia, that is - as Brent remarked.

We can know our own qualia, but it is not clear if we can communicate about them even to ourselves. We can experience them, or live them.

But if CTM is true (or even a good model) we can represent the qualia by quanta and so communicate them.

We cannot for a reason similar to the fact that we cannot define arithmetical truth in arithmetic. A qualia is never definable in term of quanta (in comp + classical definition of knowledge).

This is intuitive and amenable to thought experience, like the experience of the blind Mary which studies many books on color and qualia and still has any clue what it is like to be a seeing person.

Bruno



Brent

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