On 22 Jan 2013, at 03:02, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/21/2013 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jan 2013, at 18:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/20/2013 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing
or 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is
abstracted away by the consideration of cancellation of
properties. Let me just ask you: Did the basic idea of the
book, The Theory of Nothing by Russell Standish, make sense to
you? He is arguing for the same basic idea, IMHO.
An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already
many things to make sense.
Dear Bruno,
Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his
book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that
this word points to a concept?
Yes. But there are as many "nothing" notion than "thing" notion.
It makes sense only when we define the things we are talking about.
Dear Bruno,
There is one overarching concept in Russell Standish 's book
that is denoted by the word Nothing:
But it is a meta notion.
Hi Bruno,
Of course it is a meta-notion! I am wrestling with metaphysics
after all! I am interested in the philosophical notions that
underpin mathematics and physics.
I don't separate a priori those things.
It is equivalent with "everything".
Sure. The point is that unless there is a selective bias on that
collection of Everything, we cannot claim that Everything has any
particular properties to the exclusion of other possible properties.
We are forced to say that Everything has *all possible* properties
simultaneously or, equivalently as Prof. Standish shows, that it has
no properties at all.
The selective bias is explained by the first person indeterminacy. It
is a relative notion.
"Everything" is usually to big to have properties. What you say does
not make sense to me.
It is the main thema of this list. Assuming everything is
conceptually clearer than assuming any particular things.
Comp provides only a mathematical instantiation of such approach,
like Everett-QM on physical reality.
And that makes it just one of many possible ways to obtain
ontological theories that one can build coherent explanations
upon. ;-)
Yes. But comp is quite general, (only one scientist believe in non-
comp, and a few philosophers), and, besides, I use comp to make thing
easier, as the consequences follows from quite string weakening of comp.
"There is a mathematical equivalence between the
Everything, as represented by this collection of all
possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
no information."
You see.
But to make this precise you have to be clear of the things you
assume (sets, or numbers, or ...). + their elementary properties
without which you can do nothing.
Correct,
That contradicts what you said before.
and we cannot ignore the role of change in our "doings".
Sure. but computer science, and thus arithmetic, explains "change" and
"doing" quite well.
This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of
the ontologically primitive: that which has no particular
properties at all.
I see words without meaning, or with too much meaning.
Try harder! Guess some meaning and see if it 'works'.
I do that all the time. If I didn't I would have stopped to converse
with you. I do that up to the point where I can show that what you say
contradicts comp. Unfortunately, at that stage you try to save your
idea (in the comp context) by fuzzification, and then you lost me.
Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it
is the neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the
assumption of a well founded or reductive ontology which I argue
against except as a special case. Additionally, you consider a
static and changeless ontology whereas I consider a process
ontology, like that of Heraclitus, Bergson and A.N. whitehead.
Which makes no sense with comp. Just to define comp you have to
assume, postulate, posit the numbers and their elementary properties.
Sure, but that works within the domain of human discourse. We
formulate explanations for each other and ourselves, this does not
require that our explanation be anything more than "just so' stories
that we comfort each other with.
If that is what you seek then I understand better why you avoid
studying theories.
You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the
times, but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I
think, doesn't help.
You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing"
he describes?
Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its
reversal, but that can evolve.
I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into
a single level is causes only confusions.
This is just unfair, as the logic of self-reference (and UDA
before) explains how the levels of reality emerges from arithmetic.
OK, well can the same self-referencial logic be used to eliminate
the idea that there is a irriducible ontological ground that has
some particular properties associated with it?
This is total nonsense for me. Sorry.
We can expand and contract non-well founded logical structures as
needed. ;-)
You will still need to define an ontological background for those sets
to make sense. They will have elementary properties.
The infinite regress that so vexes ordinary logics becomes the
flexibility that allows self-referential structures to not depend on
any particular configuration.
That's already the case. I use numbers only because they are familiar.
Any Turing universal system will do.
Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (--->
physical realities).
Dear Bruno,
I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that
generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as
well except of special cases such as what you consider.
Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
| ^
| \
| \
| \
V \
Number ---> Universal Machine
All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more
ontologically primitive than the rest.
OK, like prime number exists at the same level of the natural
numbers. But they emerge through definitions that the numbers
cannot avoid when looking at themselves, so it is misleading to
make them assumed. Only the definition is proposed.
But you ignore the very process that is implied by your words
"...they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid
when looking at themselves..". Looking is an action equivalent, I
claim, to the computation of a simulation of the content of what it
is like to experience that "looking". Can a number alone be a
computer?
Yes. Relatively to the initial theory (like + and *). I will show that
precisely on FOAR some day.
Not if it can't be implemented physically!
This does not work with comp, because "physically" is defined from
numbers and addition and multiplication.
A number is merely a representaqtion, such can do many things, but
they cannot be something that persists yet changes in time. Physical
objects have 'persistence in time'. Numbers, only exist, they have
no time or change associated with them.
They have, by the many relations that they have (atemporally) with
universal numbers.
I can sum up your point by: I will not build a scientific theory.
You would be wrong. my theory predicts a few concrete things! No
ghosts, white rabbits or zombies, for one thing.
I have not seen your theory. You are usually angry when I ask for that
theory.
"Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either.
Which modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it
means the modal logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz).
But S5 is the only one standard modal logic having no
arithmetical interpretation.
Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain
this?
With Kripke:
<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is
true in at least one world accessible from alpha.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is
true in all the worlds accessible from alpha.
The alethic usual sense of "metaphysically possible" and
"metaphysically necessary" can be be given by making all worlds
accessible to each other, or more simply, by dropping the
accessibility relation:
<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is
true in at least one world.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is
true in all the worlds.
In that case you can verify that, independently of the truth
value of p, the following propositions are true in all worlds:
[](p->q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> p
[]p -> [][]p
<>p -> []<>p
(p -> []<>p can be derived). You get the system S5, and
reciprocally S5 (that is the formula above + the necessitation
rule (p/ []p), and classical propositional calculus) is
complete for all formula true (whatever values taken by the
propositional variable) in all worlds.
To sump up, in Leibniz or Aristotle all worlds are presumed to
accessible from each others (which makes sense from a highly
abstract metaphysical view). In Kripke, or in other semantics,
worlds (states, whatever) get special relations with other
worlds (accessibility, proximity, etc.).
Good, we agree on those concepts, but we need to get back to
the impasse we have over the concept of Nothing (which I am
equating to the neutral ontological primitive) and my argument
against your claim that numbers can be ontological primitives.
I will let Russell agree or not with this. I have just no clue
what you mean by the "neutral ontological primitive", as you
oppose it to numbers, it cannot even make sense once we accept
that our brain works like a machine.
Numbers have particular properties even as a category, they are
different from colors, for example. Thus this disqualifies them to
be ontologically fundamental.
There is no theory at all with a neutral ontology in your sense.
Not one.
This extensive article http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/
must be just a figment of many people's imagination...
Let me quote the first paragraph, which says exactly what I tell you
since the beginning: mainly that "neutral" means neither physical nor
mental. Arithmetic is neither mental nor physical.
<<
Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate
reality is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in
agreement with idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral
monism from its better known monistic rivals is the claim that the
intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical.
This negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality: being
intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality
is said to be neutral between the two.
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/)
>>
Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery,
you put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad
press for your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same
mistake as Goethe and Bergson, somehow.
OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!
?
I don't do literary philosophy.
I do not do literary philosophy either.
Then make you theory into a semi-axiomatic system. But when you say
that your theory assume "existence" I see only prose.
Everything I say can be verified (and has been verified by numerous
people, some taking a long time to do so, which is normal as the
second part is technically demanding).
Good! So I might wonder why the physical existence of those
people seems to be denied in your claims of immaterial Arithmeticism.
I have never denied any physical existence. Only primary physical
existence.
They are all just dreams that exist with no explanation at all!
I explain it entirely in the theory with two non logical axioms:
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
I have explained this at length and continue to do this on FOAR. I am
not sure you have understood that I am literal here, with comp as
metatheory, everything is explained (or transform into a math problem)
from just the two axioms above. UDA has already proved that it must be
like that, and AUDA explains constructively how to do the derivation.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
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