On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>
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> On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
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>> On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>
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>> On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:
>>>
>>>> You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism 
>>>> is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the 
>>>> primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 
>>>>
>>>> We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely 
>>>> arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.
>>>>
>>>> My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and 
>>>> that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno, 
>>> Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the 
>>> Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?
>>> Richard
>>>
>>
>> Quantum Deism. Cool. 
>>
>> It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of 
>> anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely 
>> arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and 
>> relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely 
>> arithmetical matrices?
>>
>>
>> You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the 
>> self-reference logics.
>>
>
> Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable 
> illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor 
> participation. 
>
>
> The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the 
> person who has such stable illusions.
>


Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of? 


>
>
> I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to 
> dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be 
> interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance 
> value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 
> 'feeling'. 
>
>
> The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & 
> p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the 
> feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.
>
>
> I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about 
feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or 
p. 
 

>
>
> The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of 
> the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are 
> techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave 
> stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is 
> achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain 
> alone.
>
>
> *that* should be illegal.
>

I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to 
use it. 

My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic 
about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. 
There is no programmatic equivalent. Nothing that I do to a robot will make 
it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct 
it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.


>
>
> While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out 
> logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and 
> feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration. 
>
>
> Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
>

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 
'unpleasant'. There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is 
only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...
 

>
>
> It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and 
> participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see 
> that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing 
> perception or participation,
>
>
> Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on 
> logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, 
> even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might 
> explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 
>

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?
 

>
>
>
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> as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense. 
>
>
>
> Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support 
> qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey 
> different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears 
> thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
>
>
I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but 
truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance. 
I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of 
experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called 
truth in one sense, but it is more than that).


>
> Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of 
> tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have 
> discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?
>
>
> We don't add it. 
> The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.
>
>
The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to 
begin with. You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by 
fiat based on our experience of selfhood.
 

>
>
>  
>
>> let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start 
>> from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but 
>> then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
>>
>
> My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.
>
>
> By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.
>

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense. That's 
why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do. If 
machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented 
cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Craig 


> Bruno
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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