On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> >> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> >> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. >> > >> > >> > My terms are: >> > >> > Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) >> > | >> > | >> > | >> > unintentional (determinism) ------------+-------------- unintentional >> > (random) >> > | >> > | >> > | >> > Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) >> > >> > >> > + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) >> > The x axis = Impersonal >> >> I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition >> of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include >> "neither determined nor random". > > > Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that > arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough > diagram is less than a 'definition'? > > >> You should start with the normal >> definition > > > Fuck that, and fuck normal. > >> >> then show that it could be neither determined nor random. >> It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts >> their conclusion into the definition of the terms. > > > It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. You > don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that > there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms are a > plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that is > the only consideration that I intend to recognize.
All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion through argument. If I "intend" to do something I do it because I want to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into the definition. >> > What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can >> > have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to >> > us. >> > Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. >> >> If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test >> then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. > > > No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not. We are talking about third person observable determinism only. The brain could be third person observable deterministic and still conscious. >> A >> computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also >> say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically >> deterministic, only habitual." > > > It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than sentient > in every way. Perhaps they are as a matter of fact, but not as a theoretical requirement, that is the point. >> I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any >> difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a >> fantastically improbably whirlwind? > > > Because the atoms are only tokens of a history. It's like if you dropped a > bunch of infants into New York City. Even if they had adult bodies, without > the history of their experience, they have no way to integrate their > perceptions. > >> >> I'd still feel basically the same, >> though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. > > > That's because you think that the universe is a place filled with objects, > but I don't think that is possible. Objects are amputated experiences. So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
