On 3/20/2013 6:43 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:24 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
> wrote:
>> http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-the-Nature-of-Personal-Identity-Peter-van-Inwagen-/176
> He starts off with a straightforward, materialist position. Then he
> reveals he is a Christian, believes in the resurrection of the body.
> How is this to be accomplished? Not by reproducing the dead person,
> since then there could be multiple copies, which he finds
> unacceptable. So God must do it using some occult method neither
> science nor philosophy can fathom.
>
>
Dear Stathis,
I agree with your critisms of what Peter van Inwagen is saying. This
is mostly because I find the concept of an entity, "God', that has the
capacities (attributed by implication) in the discussion to be
inconsistent, for example it is not possible for an entity that does not
have a continuous extension of itself in a realm to have any causal
efficacy (power to cause a change in the state of affairs) on that
realm. My motivation of posting a link to this video is that I believe
that Prof. van Inwagen's argument is qualitatively identical to Bruno's
discussion of Platonic Numbers.
If Bruno's argument is coherent (not self-contradictory) then there
must be some finite physical way to implement it, for example: Does comp
explain how computer programs and physical stuff, such as the laptop of
desktop computer that you are using to read this post and compose a
reply and sent it out, etc., are related such that actions 'in the
software' and actions of the physical stuff are correlated with each
other? I believe that comp should be capable of explaining this relation.
I have been trying to explain how Pratt's theory should that the
relation between the two (software and hardware) is one of mutual
constraint between dual aspects, but I have not stated such explicitly.
I wanted to see if the members of this list could see the implication
for themselves without my having to point this out... I see this as a
test of Pratt's idea. So far I have failed.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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