On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness
This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of
others. You can't do that.
You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and
they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make
affirmative statement on a large class of people.
That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about
large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers
on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as
machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel?
What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your
hair you become a zombie?
Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless
they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that
Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to
satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability?
You are coherent because you search a physical theory of
consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp.
I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more
seek a sensory-motive theory of physics.
I will wait for serious progresses.
But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and
contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.
That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no
more question than comp does.
You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what
you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But
you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false.
So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using
all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is
begging the question.
Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but
because I understand that experience through time can be the only
fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have
laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to
succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience
to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of
personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate
information processing without particular qualia arising, etc.
These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality
you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose
to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening
to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves
to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are
not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is
missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go
away.
Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is
false for you.
I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only
because no other option ultimately makes as much sense.
OK, but you never explain why. Of course experience are very
important, but why could a machine not support one, when it can be
shown that they will develop talk on their experience, and, if
instrosoecive enough, be confronted to the same feeling that it has to
be fundamental, and they are correct from the first person view.
The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.
No, it's more important than logic.
I think the pathetic fallacy is, as a fallacy, itself a pathetic
fallacy. From which I can't conclude.
You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have
naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive.
That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is
a machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion
meme which arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality
rather than the capacity to project and receive them.
Yes, comp feedback in this way. You don't like that, apparently, but
that's not an argument. I am not defending comp, I am just criticizing
the reason you provide to think that comp is false.
I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't
see that I am being careless at all.
Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation,
to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the
theory of other people.
I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness.
What other people think and do is none of my business.
You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect,
I have been asserting my arguments in writing for thousands of
hours. Why do you say that it is without argument unless it is
simply too awful to accept that there is no valid counter-argument?
I have not seen argument which does not invoke wishful thinking, or
begging of the question. If you find a real argument against comp,
publish it, and you will become famous. But in the literature, all
arguments against comp (like Lucas and Penrose for example) have been
debunked.
and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with
no argument that your personal feeling.
Why are common sense observations shared by all people since the
beginning of humanity reduced to 'my personal feeling', but esoteric
works of mathematics from the last couple of centuries are are
infallible?
They are not infallible, and personal feeling are not argument.
I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling,
as it looks like when we listen to them.
I understand that, but I'm saying that the whole idea that machines
might have any feeling at all is unsupported by anything except the
very theory which begs the question to begin with.
Assuming is not begging. If you assume non-comp it is all right. But
you pretend to have an argument against comp, so it is normal we ask
it too you, and well, we don't really see an argument.
To be sure, machines cannot think, and the expression "machine can
think" is a short cut for "machine can support a person with respect
to some environment".
Why would machines feel anything? "Well, lets assume that we are
machines, and therefore whatever we do is something that a machine
can do, including feel." Or, we could assume that we are ears of
corn, and therefore whatever we do is something that an ear of corn
can do if it was coaxed into becoming as complex a vegetable as we
are. We could decide that we are a TV show, and that TV shows will
someday evolve into us, so that the shows we see now are just baby
shows where the characters haven't grown very realistic yet.
You are correct. If we assume that we are angels, then we can conclude
that angels can feel. But nowhere I have attempted to prove that
machine can feel. It is my working assumption, and I am interested in
its fundamental consequence. But *you* pretend that comp is necessary
wrong, so we wait for the argument. Not a personal feeling.
I am a logician. I defend more the use of valid reasoning than the
truth of any proposition, including comp.
Let me give you a good argument against comp. It does look obvious
that there is primitive fundamental physical reality. But with comp
that cannot exist in any reasonable sense by the UDA argument, so comp
is wrong.
Of course the weakness of that argument is that there is no evidence
for a *primitively* physical reality. There are only evidences for a
physical reality. And here comp explains where such evidences comes
from.
So you will have to try harder.
Or just develop your theory, keeping some agnosticism about the fact
that your theory might contradict or not some other theories. May be
you will find a valid contradiction by working in that way, in comp or
in your theory. If not you look like a philosopher having some
prejudice against some entities a priori.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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