On 4/12/2013 6:57 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Stephen Paul King
<kingstephenp...@gmail.com> wrote:
>Telmo Menezes wrote:
>"...My understanding is that
>
>it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his
>book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the
>outcomes.
>
>This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more
>reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one
>personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own
>personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this
>particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any
>randomness magic."
>
>What people do not seem to understand is that 1st person perspectives, for
>instance, what any one version of Telmo perceives' is constrained to be
>consistent with Telmo's existence as a perciever. Observing many points of
>view simultaneously from a single location is very much like a list of
>propositions that are not mutually consistent. This is a failure of
>satisfiability in a Boolean algebra.
>The property of satisfiability does not just occur by magic...
Yes, I think about that too. It leads me to the idea that logic is
more fundamental than physical laws. I would propose that each subset
of consistent perceptions is precisely what a 1p is.
But be careful, I think it matters what domain logic is applied to. When quantum mechanics
was first proposed people said a particle can't be in two different states at the same
time - that just violates logic.
Brent
That's why I am
not aware of my alters, and maybe why I am not aware that I am you.
I'm counting memories as perceptions for simplification -- one could
imagine the brain as a bag of states that can be perceived, which is
perhaps a bizarre way of defining memory / personal diaries.
Telmo.
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