On Sunday, April 14, 2013 1:27:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 14 Apr 2013, at 00:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Saturday, April 13, 2013 6:47:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>>> With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>>
>>
>> Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter 
>> doesn't relay on geometry?
>>
>>
>> "comp can generate geometry" does not mean something clear.
>>
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> I think its pretty clear. Without a printer or video screen, my computer 
> cannot generate geometry. 
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> Why?
> (printer and video screen are not geometry).
>

Printers and video screen have no other purpose other than to manifest 
geometric forms in public.
 

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> There are program able to solve geometrical puzzle by rotating "mentally" 
> (in their RAM, without using screen, nor printer) complex geometrical 
> figure, ...
>

That's what I'm saying. All geometric function can be emulated 
computationally with no literal geometry. The puzzle shapes aren't 
literally "in" the RAM. There is no presentation of shape in that universe, 
and the addition of shape (from screens or printers) would add nothing to 
that computation.


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> It doesn't matter how much CPU power or memory I have, the functions will 
> come no closer to taking on a coherent geometric form somewhere. I can make 
> endless computations about circles and pi, but there is never any need for 
> any literal presentation of a circle in the universe. No actual circle is 
> present.
>
>
> Not sure I have ever see an actual circle anywhere, nor do I think that 
> seeing proves existence ...
>

I don't think that there is 'existence'. There is seeing, feeling, 
touching, etc. I don't understand what you mean by not being sure if you 
have seen an actual circle anywhere. OOOOOOOO see? Those are actual circles 
that you see on your screen. The computer doesn't see those though. It 
doesn't see the similarity between o,O,0,*O*,*o*, etc. To the computer 
there are different quantities associated with the ASCII characters, 
different codes for font rendering as screen pixels or printer 
instructions, etc, but unless you are running an OCR program, the computer 
by default has no notion of visual circularity associated with OOOOOOOO.
 

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>>
>> But what can be shown is that in the comp theory, you can assume only 
>> number (or combinators) and the + and * laws, this generates all the 
>> dreams, which can be shown to generate from the machine points of view, 
>> geometry, analysis, and physics. 
>>
>
> That's only because you have given + and * the benefit of the dream to 
> begin with. 
>
>
> No. I begin with assuming that the brain is Turing emulable. It is not 
> that obvious to get everything (brain and consciousness) from + and *.
>

It's one thing to assume that the brain is Turing emulable, but another to 
assume that interior experience is isomorphic to brain activity. My view is 
that it is not. To the contrary, exteriority is the anesthetic, 
orthomodular reflection of interiority. This orthomodularity is total, so 
that it circumscribes both arithmetic truth and ontological realism 
entirely.

http://multisenserealism.com/2013/04/14/1060/ 


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> Comp is tautology.
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> If comp was tautology, I would like you to attribute to my sun in law, the 
> one with the digital brain, a little more tautological consideration. You 
> should accept that he has consciousness then.
>

He doesn't have consciousness, but he has the capacity to broadly and 
deeply enrich our consciousness. I give him the appropriate consideration, 
he gets a nice juicy retro-memory implant of a generic steak eating 
experience - free of charge!
 

>
> But of course that is not the case, as comp might be false, logically. 
> Indeed, it can be shown refutable, and if the evidences were that physics 
> is Newtonian, I would say that comp would be quite doubtful.
>
>
>
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>  
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>> Then we can compare physics with the empirical data and confirm of refute 
>> comp (but not proving comp). 
>> Since already Diophantus, but then systematically since Descartes, the 
>> relation between geometry and arithmetic are deep and multiple. It is a 
>> whole subject matter, a priori independent from comp.
>>
>
> What is the relation between comp and geometry?
>
>
> It extends already the very many relation between number and geometry 
> discovered by Descartes.
> Most elementary geometries on the reals are decidable, and so are common 
> toys in the machine's dreams, then it is like an old couple, the relations 
> are for the best and the worth. For example the fact that the following 
> diophantine equation has no non trivial solution---- x^2 = 2*y^2---is 
> equivalent with the fact that the diagonal of a square, in the euclidienne 
> plane, is incommensurable with the side of the square. They have no common 
> unities. 
> You can sum up 90% of math by the study of the relation between the 
> numbers and the geometries.
>

It seems that there are implicit equivalences but only after the fact of 
geometry. Geometry itself is a separate aesthetic dimension which does not 
follow explicitly from comp.


See if you like my idea for a Sci-Fi story about artificial 
qualia/hyper-quanta: http://s33light.org/post/47951545367

I think that while we disagree on whether machines experience qualia 
themselves, I think we can both agree on the idea that machine discovered 
quanta can be translated into our experience as significantly novel 
qualitative content, if not new sensory modalities (by perceptual cheating 
or neural mod).

Craig


> Bruno
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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