On Sunday, April 21, 2013 8:45:39 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 20 Apr 2013, at 13:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:46:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 19 Apr 2013, at 13:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> Qualia are generated, 
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>> With comp the qualia are not generated. They are arithmetical truth seen 
>> from some point of view. They cannot even been defined, but it can be shown 
>> that they obeys to some laws (including the maws of not being definable).
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>> but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no 
>> possible function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined purely by 
>> function, that qualia cannot be possible. 
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>> This does not follow. Qualia might be epiphenomenal.
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> Whether qualia is epiphenomenal or not is up to the participant. That is 
> their role from 3p perspective, to select which sensory affect they prefer 
> or allow to influence their motive output, and thus contribute to public 
> realism. Free will is the active modality of qualia, turning 
> superpositioned epiphenomena into thermodynamically committed phenomena.
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>> But this does not follow for another reason: qualia have a function/role, 
>> although in the intensional (program related) sense, and not really in the 
>> usual extensional one (set of input-outputs). So it is preferable to refer 
>> to computation instead of function, which is an ambiguous term in computer 
>> science.
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> What role could qualia have to a program that would not be accomplished by 
> other quantitative means? Any number, for example, can be used as a precise 
> and absolutely unique identifier - why would a colorful name be used 
> instead of that? If we don't add in high level names for our own benefit, 
> by default strings like SIDs and GUIDs are easier to use.
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>> What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by 
>> function. It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set of all 
>> arithmetic truths. 
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>> This is vague. I can agree (in comp) and disagree (in comp).
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>> If 'universe' denotes the big whole, by definition it has no input nor 
>> output, and so is equivalent with the unique function from nothing to 
>> nothing. The empty function = { }.
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> That's only if you assume a number system based on a null default. I am 
> using the totality as a default. The universe is the set of all inputs and 
> outputs; every significant function (not every function, since the universe 
> is not a nonsense generator of accidental sense like UD, but an elitist 
> aesthetic agenda which chooses which functions to formally pay attention 
> to/materialize and which to leave as theoretical potentials).
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>> So "universe" is already an intensional term, and should be handled with 
>> intensional tools, like computer science, modal logic, etc. Then assuming 
>> comp, we can explain how the physical universe appearance is given by 
>> internal modalities, some locally sharable (quanta), and some not locally 
>> sharable (qualia).
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> These tools are only useful to organize aesthetic phenomena which already 
> exist (insist). No logic or Doxastic framework can ever account for qualia. 
> Who cares if we know all of the things that satisfy some relation to the 
> experience of seeing red? That doesn't let the blind see red.
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> We cannot know all the things that satisfy some relation of seeing red, 
> oeven of comuting x+y. Machines prove this or similar in their own qualia 
> theory, with some reasonable axiomatic of qualia.
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> You systematically talk about the machine we thought we knew before the 
> advent of the universal machine. You just confirms systematically that you 
> have not taken the time to study computer science.
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> Develop your theory, and then compare it to comp, if you want, but then 
> study it.
>

What are you saying in particular is different about my understanding of a 
machine and the post Turing understanding regarding the presentation of 
qualia though? 

I think you're dodging the question and making it about the knowability of 
qualia, when qualia has nothing to do with knowledge. Knowledge can tell 
you about experiences that you have not have, but nothing can tell you 
about experience itself.  I don't care if there is a family of equations 
that add up to be a picture of Plato with a thought balloon saying "qualia 
goes here" - unless it turns numbers and functions into feelings and 
flavors and electromotive power then it's still ultimately a way to talk 
about reality rather than a way of replacing it.

Craig


> Bruno
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> Craig
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>> Bruno
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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