On 26 May 2013, at 14:16, Roger Clough wrote:
Materialism fails to account for the first person
Sentience or sentient experience or experience
or consciousness all require a subject who is
conscious. The first person in grammatical language.
I.
This is missing in materialistic accounts of consciousness,
but present in Leibniz's monads.
This is partially correct. With mechanism, which excels on the
different notion of self, the materialist can still account for a
large part of the subjective or the first person. So they can
attribute a mind to an object. What they cannot do is to associate an
object to a mind. In fact this is interesting as it points on a way to
explain the how and why of the appearance of matter for the numbers.
The problem of the materialist is that they believe (often
dogmatically) in Matter. I lost that faith. I am agnostic on it.
Bruno
Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/26/2013
See my Leibniz site at
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough
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