On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 10:16:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with comp this >>> is given by arithmetical relations. >>> >>> >> Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me. >> >> >> Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously. >> > > > I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in mind. > > > > OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that comp is > wrong, without explaining why. >
It's not that I believe comp is wrong, I just understand why it would be wrong but seem like it is right. I've tried to explain why many, many times - it's pretty straightforward I think: Computation is, in all cases, a representation system which is used to automate sensory-motive interactions rather than generate sensation itself. It rides on the back of aesthetic experience as a figure, or set of functional steps, but it has no aesthetic agenda of its own. It's not a matter of belief, because I wouldn't care one way or another about whether the beauty of mechanism or the beauty of awareness is primary, it's just that over the course of developing the hypothesis that I have put together, I have come to realize why it happens to be the case that representation can only exist within sensory presentation and not the other way around. This post I wrote yesterday actually relates... http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/24/diogenes-revenge-cynicism-semiotics-and-the-evaporating-standard/ > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on other. To >>> make clear what we assume. >>> >> >> That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If you start >> out granting numbers imagination, then you have already have consciousness, >> and have no need for comp. >> >> >> Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and >> computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of everything is >> elementary arithmetic. >> > > > Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can just be > presumed to be part of numbers imagination. > > > No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly what we > see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum structure, and a core > symmetrical structure (but we have not yet really its linear aspect, nor > the measure istelf, etc.). > Whatever it predicts correctly would validate arithmetic tautologically, while everything that it cannot predict (like flavors and colors) can still just be categorized as numbers imagination. > > > > Comp is not a theory of everything, > > > Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or assumption. > Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that the theory of > everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing equivalent. > It's still only a theory of Turing equivalence, which doesn't include any epistemic access to the question of what lies beyond. > > > > its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined by > computations. > > > Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the > imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, > now), so it is a monism. > If it could be reduced, then why wouldn't it be? It's still a dualism of that which is computation and that which can be reduced from computation. The question is, where does computation inflate itself to in the first place? > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why would >>> they have a smell or sound? >>> >>> >>> Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the doctor. >>> >> >> Yes, you would. >> >> >> Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. >> > > Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them. > > > Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hope for > it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulability of > biophysical known object) are not misleading. > But we already know they are misleading, otherwise there would be no dualism concept to begin with. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. >>> >>> I am interested only in the refutability of comp. >>> >> >> That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair. >> Consciousness is not about refutability, >> >> >> >> Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory. >> > > Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousness can > only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertion and the > assertion of all bases. > > > You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is coherent > with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against comp. > Comp can't have an argument against it because it is tautological. My theory explains why that is. A sufficiently reductionist mindset will fall prey to its own absolutism. Anthropomorphic and mechanemorphic absolutism will both use their own toy models of the universe which reflect back the bias that goes into it. If you put the universe into a mathematical box, then you will get a response from the universe as it describes itself on that level. To argue against comp, you must poke out your eyes and try to prove to the blind man that sight exists. > > > > > >> >> >> it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a second order >> logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard of refutability, then >> you cannot be surprised when we take a puppet for a person. >> >> >> I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. >> > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8 > > > Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. > Hehe Craig > > Bruno > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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