On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are
these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite
subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order
that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see
any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more
even numbers that square numbers?).
And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a
Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?
If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences", (then),
disappearing, please do.
I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you refer to? And
you're asking why they disappeared?
The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the
observer"
I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are
just something that happens in the mathematics.
But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon interference in
the two slits experiment.
?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single photon will land in
a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of observer required.
When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the "quantum wave"
describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many*
dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication.
There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective
probabilities of contemplated futures.
I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.
OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real, which is a bit
weird to me.
The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures. Or even the
result of considering all possible paths.
I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition
disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there
are still "many".
Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours. I think Fuchs
view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book "The
Evolution of Reason" - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view
he defends at length in "Interview with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1
OK.
It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.
We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality.
Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.
Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower,
the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can
generate some strong "don't ask" imperative.
You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.
I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.
I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you do
the same).
What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself define by a
relative universal numbers.
Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his actions.
Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist points of view, and
an whole theology including his physics, etc.
Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally comfortable with not
explaining everything.
Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.
What's your explanation for the existence of persons? So far what I've heard is that
it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very enlightening.
What do you miss in the UDA?
As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's only your inference that
observers (and the rest of the multiverse) *must be in there somewhere* because you've
assumed that everything is computable.
Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the story that goes
along with the mathematics, is important insofar as it gives you insight into how to
apply the mathematics and to extend your theories. He is critical of Everett's MWI for
not doing that, or at least not doing it well.
Well, perhaps Fuchs is a bit out of topic, once you agree that it is only Everett in a
psychological version.
It's kinda funny to see "only...psychological" from a guy who wants to show that
everything is a shared dream.
That is close to comp. But comp leads, by UDA, that the theory of everuthing is just
elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent, like colmbinatirs, ...). Then everything is
defined in a very precise way in that theory.
Is it? What's an electron then? What's John K. Clark? I don't see that these things are
defined *in that theory* at all.
Brent
And this explains both 100% matter and 99,999... % of consciousness. The explanation
might be false, of course, but is testable.
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
Brent
"I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of
integrity."
--- Fredrick Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols"
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