On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 11:18:39 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 17 October 2013 16:12, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 9:11:02 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 16 October 2013 14:05, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but 
>>>>>> that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the 
>>>>>> outside 
>>>>>> in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build 
>>>>>> itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it 
>>>>>> is 
>>>>>> doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things 
>>>>>> that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more 
>>>>>> evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of 
>>>>>> mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, 
>>>>> molecular-component-**containing**) machine? (Or is "machine" being 
>>>>> defined in a specialised sense here?) 
>>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> A human being is the collective self experience received during the 
>>>> phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that 
>>>> experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its 
>>>> own perception.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That's cool, but if the body is a (complicated, etc) machine, then 
>>> either those experiences are part of the machine, or they're something 
>>> else. If they're part of the machine then you're wrong in some of the 
>>> above-quoted statements (and you contradicted yourself by saying that a 
>>> machine doesn't grow from a cell, by the way) If it's something else, then 
>>> - depending on the nature of that something else - it's possible that other 
>>> things have it, and we don't recognise the fact. It would be important to 
>>> know what that something else is before one can construct an argument. (For 
>>> example, I believe Bruno thinks the "something else" is an infinite sheaf 
>>> of computations.)
>>>
>>
>> Have you considered that it might be the body which is part of a sheaf of 
>> experiences? 
>>
>
> Since Bruno started trying to explain comp to me, I have indeed considered 
> that. It could be, for example, via the mechanism you mentioned in your 
> previous post:
>
> Bruno considers arithmetic to be behind mechanism, mechanism to be behind 
>> awareness, and awareness to be behind physics.
>>
>
I would have agreed with Bruno completely a few years ago, but since then I 
think that it makes more sense that arithmetic is a kind of sense than that 
sense could be a kind of arithmetic. I think that mechanism is a kind of 
arithmetic and arithmetic is a kind of sense, as is private awareness a 
kind of sense. 

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