Hi jason >>I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective.
In what way? Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? Have you ever seen an rock quivering in doubt? Certainty/uncertainty are properties of 1-p experiences and can't be anything but. >>I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM >>probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%. Are you going to show an error of reasoning or are you going to point to a dead physicist? I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 >> There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. >> For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label "chris peck". >> This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences all outcomes" but that does >> not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has >> only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any >> experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome. The experiences >> are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the >> decohered worlds. ISTM that you're missing the point of my argument. You don't seem to get that it is very well understood that there is only one stream of experience per 'I'. The trouble is that in step 3 these 'I's get duplicated from one 'I' to two 'I's AND I am obliged axiomatically to assume my 'I'ness survives in both duplicates. So, when asked what will I experience ... and remember, there is only one 'I' at this point ... how can I answer 'either or' without violating this axiom I am obliged to accept? Alternatively, perhaps neither of the future 'I's are this earlier 'I'. In which case, I am forced to predict I will experience nothing and again that violates the axiom. The only choice I can make here is to predict this single 'I' will experience each outcome once duplicated. This is the only prediction I can make which doesn't violate the survival axiom I am bound to. >> In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective >> randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which is >> enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA. On the contrary, Jason, I find the concept of subjective uncertainty extremely unlikely in both MWI and COMP and find the 50/50 prediction particularly a little bit silly. Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly dream argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal logic. Im not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy to have you on board. regards. Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 11:36:06 +1300 Subject: Re: For John Clark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving probablistically. Presumably a sentient dice (or die*) would feel the same way. * "Take the dice or die!" as my son once said while playing Monopoly. He was just being pedantic but it got my attention. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
