On 24 Oct 2013, at 18:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 24, 2013 10:16:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2013, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
<snip>
"My problem is that you need
to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this
remark."
Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the
math instead?
With comp, when you test the flavor of coffee, you do, actually,
test the flavor of some math.
That's what I am saying. It would have to be the case under comp. My
point though is that it is absurd. Tasting something gives us no
mathematical understanding.
It does. It might teach you what math looks like from inside. Or you
beg the question. keep in mind I don't argue for comp, but you are
arguing against comp, so it is up to you to give some argument that
testing a flavor cannot be a mathematical phenomenon.
The understanding that flavor does provide is the opposite of math.
It is immediate
Thanks to many cells doing a work learned through a very long time,
may be. It seems immediate, but the evidences (brains) is that it is
not.
(although develops briefly through time as well), it is irreducible
to anything other than flavor, and it does not consist of 'stepped
reckoning' of any kind, it is an aesthetic gestalt.
OK. No problem with this in the comp theory. That's the point of the
limitation theorems. Some truth can be accessible by machine, without
them having to do any hard work.
But you test it from the inside of math, and so it looks different
from the math we learn at school. That it looks different is
explainable by any Löbian machine,
Taste doesn't look like anything though, and it cannot ever look
like anything. If it did, then it would be vision. If it could be
vision, then it would be profoundly redundant to have both senses of
the same data...(assuming that Santa Claus has brought the
possibility of senses to begin with.)
and can be understood intuitively with some training in the comp
thought experiment. The difference are accounted by the intensional
nuance of Gödel's provability.
I don't think it is. It seems clear to me that any mechanical
accounting of sense implicitly takes sense for granted from the
start. There is no functional difference between sight, smell,
feeling, hearing, etc. There is no intensional nuance that ties to
the possibility of any one of them - only a grey box where something
like virtual proof could theoretically live.
I can relate to your feelings, but I don't see why a machine could not
too. You just assert it, but you don't really provide an argument.
You do point on a difficulty, but a difficulty is not an
impossibility, especially that computer science already explains why
machines will find that difficult too, for their own accessible truth
spectrum.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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