On 29 Oct 2013, at 03:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:
So matter is just maya-illusion.
Yes. That's the result. UDA shows that if we can survive with a
digital brain, by virtue of its infomation handling power (and not
some magic), then matter is only appearance in the mind of some
(relative) numbers.
That's the key point.
That is really religion- right?
Hmm... The tone used here makes me suspecting that you are using
"religion" in some pejorative sense.
But yes it is theology. I insist on this almost at the start: comp is
the belief in a form of technological reincarnation, and as such,
cannot be justified rationally. We have to bet.. But we can do that
bet from evidences (nature exploits replacement all the times, the
known laws are all Turing emulable, etc.).
It means also that if a scientist says "science as shown that we are
machine", that scientist is a pseudo-scientist, or a pseudo-priest, or
some con who want steal your money.
Comp is "yes doctor", and it entails the right to say "No, doctor".
Comp makes number theology the most fundamental science unifying all
the others. Indeed.
Of course today's theology has not yet come back to the academy, and
institutionalized theologies are politicized and used to control
people. We are still in an era where we tolerated authoritative
arguments in religion (and other human sciences), where actually it is
the place where such arguments are the most wrong possible.
The enlightenment period was half-enlightenment. All sciences go
through, except the most fundamental one: theology. Theology has been
scientific only with the Greeks, Chinese and Indian. In Occident it is
still a taboo.
I like to say: bad faith fears reason, bad reason fears faith.
Bruno
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
2013/10/28 Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that
you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.
Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are the
machine that computes because they are enumerable. It derives
everything else. In particular the Metaverse machine derives the
universe big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannot say what
derives the Metaverse machine
Bruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in
arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the
machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter
lives in the machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to be short).
If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to
percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.
Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outside
of comp?
No, matter is an appearance hence the use of "machine's belief in
matter". There is no primary matter (assuming comp).
That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derived physical
realities. If it does not do that, what good is it?
Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics
becomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal
machine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice
of the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.
Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement that
comp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion.
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com
4:53 AM (2 hours ago)
to everything-list
On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:
It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse.
How?
Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi-
Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonic
variation of the fine structure constant across the visible universe.
The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can
derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.
>It seems also that you believe in a computable universe, but that
cannot be the case if our
>(generalized) brain is computable.
Richard: That does not make sense.
If my brain is Turing emulable, and if I am in some state S,
whatever will happen to me is determined by *all* computations going
through the state S (or equivalent). Our first person indeterminacy
domain is an infinite and non computable set of computations. The
indeterminacy domain is not computable because we cannot recognize
our 1p in 3p-computations (like the one done by the UD).
Please take a look at the detailed explanation in the sane04 paper.
You need only the first seven steps of the UDA, which does not
presuppose any special knowledge.
It gives to any fundamental physics some non computable features.
Keep in mind that the computable is somehow strictly included in
the provable (by universal machine) strictly included in truth.
Computable is Turing equivalent with sigma_1 provable, but
arithmetical truth is given by the union of all sigma_i, for i = 0,
1, 2, 3, ... (this needs a bit of theoretical computer science).
Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic,
but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's
belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in
the machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to be short).
If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to
percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.
By the UDA, and classical logic, you get the physical certainty, by
the true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (the UD-accessible states),
which are provable (true in all consistent extensions) and
consistent (such accessible consistent extensions have to exist).
That's basically, for all p sigma_1 (= "ExP(x") for some P decidable
arithmetical formula) beweisbar('p') & ~beweisbar('~p') & p. The
operator for that, let us write it "[]", provides a quantum logic,
by the application of "[]<>p". This gives a quantization of
arithmetic due to the fact, introspectively deducible by all
universal machines, that we cannot really know who we are and which
computations and universal numbers sustain us. Below our
substitution level, things *have* to become a bit fuzzy, non
clonable, non computable, indeterminate.
In fact this answers a question asked by Wheeler, and on which Gödel
said only that the question makes no sense and is even indecent! The
question was "would there be a relationship between incompleteness
and Heisenberg uncertainties?"
There is no direct derivation of Heisenberg uncertainty from
incompleteness, as that would be indecent indeed, but assuming comp
and understanding the FPI, you can intuit why the fuzziness has to
emerge from inside the digital/arithmetic, below or at our
substitution level, and the math of self-reference gives a quick way
to get the propositional logic of that "universal
physics" (deducible by all correct computationalist UMs).
And there is the Solovay gifts, which are theorems which show that
incompleteness split those logics,. That is useful for
distinguishing the true part of that physics from the part that the
machine can (still introspectively) deduces. Some intensional
nuances, like the "[]" above, inherit the split, some like the Bp &
p does not, and facts of that type can help to delineate the quanta
from the qualia, but also the terrestrial (temporal) from the divine
(atemporal).
Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes
elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point
of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal
system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.
Comp suggests to extend Everett on the universal quantum wave on
arithmetic and the universal machines dreams. The wavy aspect being
explained by the self-embedding in arithmetic. Comp entails a sort
of self-diffraction.
No problem trying to get the fundamental physics from observation,
and indeed that will help for the comparison. The approach here
keep the 1/p 3/p distinctions all along, and in that sense proposes
a new formulation, and ways to consider, the mind-body problem (in
which I am interested and is the main motivation for interviewing
the antic, the contemporaries and the universal numbers :)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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