On 18 Nov 2013, at 00:53, LizR wrote:
If the universe exists for long enough
It has to be virtually infinite, have special homogeneity conditions,
and even in that case, I don't see how a Boltzman brain can exist a
sufficiently long time to get the deep and linear comp state capable
of explaining our observation. Even if by chance a BB emulate a
Universal Dovetailer, you will need infinite constraints and large
period of time, to get states influencing the FPI.
they appear to be inevitable. No doubt that leads to some sort of
Bayesian argument about the universe not being able to last too
long, or we'd all be BBs (too long would be an awfully long time, to
misquote Peter Pan).
However, can we be sure we aren't? Maybe comp has something to say
about this... :)
But people invoking the BBs are not aware of the FPI. If BB exists
(and run long enough), we are emulated by them, and the physical laws
are given by the statistics on the computations run by them, and run
in arithmetic. Now, in arithmetic, there is an infinty of BBs, and an
infinity of emulation of ourselves, and the BB does not play any
special role.
BBs are just a a variant of "brain in a vat". With comp, they don't
make sense other than the trivial sense that arithmetic contains all
BBs, all brains in a vat, but eventually the "matter" of those
emulators is themselves an "hallucination" stable by the global FPI
(the FPi on the whole arithmetic). This makes BBs sorts of physicalist
ill defined notion: their presence of absence does not change anything
more than the existence of brains, aliens, etc. Primitive material
physical emulators , be them brain or Boltzman brain, simply don't
exist. They emerge from *all* computations which exists in arithmetic.
Bruno
On 18 November 2013 03:23, <spudboy...@aol.com> wrote:
I think K. Susskind, is, or was a supporter of Boltzmann Brains,
which is a wild, subject, if true.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
