On 10 Dec 2013, at 13:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: Comp is computationalism, and I "pretend" (at the least) to
derive the consequences from it. So, if you want to act like a
scientist, just accept the definition given, and show a flaw in the
derivation. The very fact that you don't act like that suggests that
you are not interested in finding the flaw, if it exists.
Richard: I suggest that comp and esp MWI may be flawed on the
empirical basis of photosynthesis where quantum coherence allows the
incoming electron (as they say) to sample every possible
superposition or MWI pathway and then chooses the optimal path. I do
not know that to be true, but that appears to be the scientific
consensus.
Yes. Plants and some bacteria do quantum computations, or some quantum
exploitation, yes. It is amazing.
But this does not prove that the brain do similar in a way relevant to
our substitution level, and even if it does, it is still a question of
level as the UD emulates all quantum computers too. Even if 'super-
exponentially' slowly (but the first person don't mind).
The point is that if comp is true we have to justify the winner from
inside.
Bruno
PS will take a look on the paper below, but keep in mind that quantum
computer does not violate Church thesis, and the UD emulates them all,
and so are also realized by arithmetical true relations.
Bruno
If MWI were true, every possible pathway, as they say, would be
chosen and not just the optimal one. I posted this once before but
got no response.
http://www.neuroquantology.com/index.php/journal/announcement/view/68
Superposition in Photosynthesis
On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 09 Dec 2013, at 18:45, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 3:52 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> I mean what everybody mean by computationalism in the cognitive
science
Bullshit. "Comp" differs from computationalism in that "comp"
includes all the silly (and contradictory) conclusions from your
error riddled "proof".
Comp is computationalism, and I "pretend" (at the least) to derive
the consequences from it. So, if you want to act like a scientist,
just accept the definition given, and show a flaw in the derivation.
The very fact that you don't act like that suggests that you are not
interested in finding the flaw, if it exists.
> We assume comp!
Every logical man should assume computationalism,
This is simply ridiculous. It is logically conceivable that comp
might be wrong. You are really saying that "my axioms" are true,
which is philosophy (I don't do that). You confuse science and
philosophy.
no logical man should assume "comp", the ideas behind it are as
nonstandard as the word itself.
"comp" is derived from comp. So, "comp" is never assumed. Only comp.
It is up to you to show a flaw if you disbelieve that "comp" follows
from comp.
> we can put our shoes in them.
That's not the problem. In your duplicating machine thought
experiment there are lots and lots of shoes around and one pair is
no better than another,
Good. that's part of why the unique person I will be (with P = 1),
is undetermined.
so its completely ambiguous
It is undetermined, but not ambiguous. You know precise things here:
1) you know that you will feel to be one precise person, in W or in M.
2) you know that any precise prediction will be refuted by a copy,
and that we have to take into account all copies, as all have the
right to be considered as having survived, so you know that you
cannot know which of W and M will be your next experience.
Now, if you want to call that the 1-ambiguity, be my guest, and the
step 4 question will be: do that ambiguity remain unchanged if we
introduce delays in the reconstitution in Moscow? Changing the
vocabulary will change nothing in the reasoning and its conclusions.
to say that after duplication "you" will see this but "you" will
not see that.
> The guy in W will say, "gosh, I am the one in W, why?"
Because he's the W guy. He did not turn into the W guy and then see
W,
That changes nothing.
he saw W and then turned into the W guy. And both the W guy and the
M guy will say I was the H guy.
Exactly, and that makes the point, once you understand that we were
asking a prediction on the possible 1-experience.
> the first person does not feel has having duplicated.
There is no "the first person" there is only "a first person".
>> and see no reason shoes can't be duplicated just like
everything else.
> Not a first person experience FROM the view of the first person
experience.
FROM which "first person experience" is Bruno Marchal referring to?
Anyone of them. We have to interview all of them, or a good sample
of them.
> Do you agree with this? That the probability in Helsinki that
(you will feel to be in one city) is equal to one?
^
^^
WHO THE HELL IS "YOU"?
Distracting question which is out topic, as it has been explained ad
nauseam. You are ust avoiding answering the question.
Bruno Marchal simply can not speak about personal identity unless
there are lots of personal pronouns to hide behind.
You need only to take the content of the diaries into account.
John, you have not answered the question I asked you. Do you agree
that in Helsinki we have:
Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") =
1 (assuming comp and all the default assumptions) ?
Don't say "who the hell is "you?", because we don't need to answer
that. If both copies get a cup of coffee in the cities, and that you
are told this in Helsinki, comp implies that in Helsinki P("I will
drink coffee") = 1, or you should no more say that P = 1 with the
simple teleportation (without duplication) and eventually you have
to say "no" to the doctor and abandon comp.
The identity question is *quite* interesting, but 100% irrelevant
here.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
