On 13 Dec 2013, at 13:17, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA,
billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA.
Richard: I am proposing that the finite 3D array of 10^90/cc compact
space particles are a computer for implementing RA.
I must have used the word emulation improperly.
You were correct. But the question remains. String theory is a theory
inferred from observation. With computationalism, if string theory is
the correct physics, we must show how to deduce it from RA, and we
must justify why it win the measure "battle" in between all universal
machines below our substitution level. String theory might be the
answer, but it has yet to be extracted from its arithmetical subpart,
to solve the mind-body problem. Indeed by UDA we have to do that, and
the advantage is that we will get both the scientific communicable
parts (through G and its intensional variants), and the
"scientifically not scientific" incommunicable (+ the inexpressible)
parts (through G* and its intensional variant).
Bruno
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM
can still be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be
geographical (and thus variable in the whole of the physical
reality).
Richard: Astronomical observations/measurements of the structure
constant across nearly the whole visible universe indicates that
the constants are to-first-order approximately monotonically
variable as a function of space, but not time. So the substitution
level may be far above the quantum level and that is a hypothesis
in my model, to have the 6d particles of space, at a density of
10^90/cc, emulate RA.and the comp ontology.
Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard
ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA.
The interesting thing would be to not only show that RA emulates the
particles and waves in the mind of PA, ZF, you and me and other
"observers in RA", but to show that such an emulation is statistical
stable with respect to the FPI (which is the difficult task) to do).
Bruno
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Richard Ruquist
<yann...@gmail.com> wrote:
Bruno: Please tell me if above helped.
Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being "celestial, divine creatures,
if you want. "We" (first person) are already in "heaven", or
Platonia, " is completely consistent with my thinking
Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which
should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she
would provide evidence against digital mechanism.
Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps
distinguishable,
perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime
sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds.
These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp
if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them;
amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp.
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.
[if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is
empirically likely]
Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is
duplication possible?
It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple
answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we
*bet* that there is a level of description where we can be coded
"into a number" and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or
equivalently, emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or
its sigma_1 complete part).
Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to
illustrate the "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with.
1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular
level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between
the 'particles'.
2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state
of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local
cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the
level of the "right" fields, or at the level of elementary strings
and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger
picture if you prefer. No collapse!
Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to
use in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before
"jumping" into UD* at step 7.
Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as
it exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels,
with all oracles, infinitely often.
Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low
level. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital
encoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the
brain and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy of
many slight variants, making the theory working through some
digital encodings.
Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be
defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving
all universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly
clonable.
But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow
bodies. We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories
(the 1p view in the computations where you survive).
We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first
person) are already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the
arithmetical true relations in between possible universal numbers
and other (arithmetical) entities.
If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you
have still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer,
quantum mind) or not.
The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes
from the fact that
1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit
very slowly)
2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are
the delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD).
I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same
question.
Please tell me if above helped. In step 1-6 I imagine a high
level, to simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of
a non stopping UD run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever
is your level.
If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum
doctor. Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not
change the consequences.
To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should
be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she
would provide evidence against digital mechanism.
Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, it
appears more and more unbelievable.
It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine.
Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the truth
of comp, I just study the consequences.
Bruno
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and
without thinking to much
on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-
cloning" theorem.
The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without
assuming physics.
I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents
that theorem.
But do not understand your argument.
It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty
principle.
Could you discuss this?
The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far
you go in the UD-Argument.
If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we
need to assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal
formalism/theory, and I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing.
Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the
arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of
computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person
will not see the difference) going through your state, defined by
some substitution level. Below the level, and thus in the
"apparent matter", there will be an infinity of computations
needed to describe exactly that matter (the global FPI domain in
arithmetic). This makes a priori the apparent primitive matter non-
clonable. The primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on
infinity of histories/computations, and you need the entire
running of the UD to define it (to get the global FPI). It is not
something a priori duplicable.
So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms
this (which *proves* nothing, to be sure).
If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum
level (that is for example the position and impulsion of our
particles at the Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then
quantum mechanics will be exactly derivable from comp. If our
substitution level is below the Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we
would have a quantum brain/computer) then things are more complex.
As the UD emulates also all quantum computations, the reversal
physics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be the
fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an
approximation of an unknown theory (something like a non-linear
QM). I doubt this from the evidences both from introspection,
biology and physics. If our subst level is far above the quantum
level, then QM can still be derivable from arithmetic, but some
constants can be geographical (and thus variable in the whole of
the physical reality).
We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the
UDA before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult
question.
Bruno
Richard
On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal
<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:
Hi List
I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on
line magazine
Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury
Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but
the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without
thinking to much on the theoretical consequences of the possible
survival.
To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms
the use of comp by biological system all the time.
Bruno
George Levy
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