On 12/16/2013 1:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 10:14, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:
On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
although
Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered
one world
and wrote about the "relative state" of the observer and the observed system.
In some ways this is more fundamental because in principle the "different
worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another. That they usually don't
is a
statistical result.
("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big
Bang
(better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing
Region of
Infinite Gravity :)
I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic
theories just
push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused
event or
an infinite past. So there is not great intellectual virtue in
rejecting
uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case.
It has
randomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such
a way
that it produces the classical world at a statistical level.
The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
there is an
original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for
example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can
say the
same about an infinite past.
Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
computations of a
universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired by
QM, but
QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a
variable you
only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If
you
measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.
I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and
that they
simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its
existence. Did I get that wrong?
I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists a
successor
of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a confusion to say
that a
logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the
ontological
sense.
Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is correct? (Which is
fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)
Yes. I think it is a questionable hypothesis.
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
indeterminacy,
without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the
equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one
has it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all the time
anyway?)
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple explanation
by a
call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's
in
Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical than
"that atom
decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."
Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical (although that
leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow (magically?) control the
behaviour of atoms actually do so.)
I don't think they 'control' them, I think they describe them (to the best of our
knowledge). Notice that this explains "where the laws of physics come from"; they're
invented by us.
Personally, I don't find the "argument from incredulity" works for me any more towards
maths being "less real" than primitive matter. Maybe I've been in contact with Bruno for
too long.
Bruno, has a good point about 'primitive matter'. It doesn't really mean anything except
'the stuff our equations apply to.'; but since the equations are made up descriptions, the
stuff they apply to is part of the model - not necessarily the ding an sich. To say
physicist assume primitive matter is little more than saying that they make models and
some stuff is in the model and some isn't - which of course is contrary to the usual
assumption on this list. :-)
Brent
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