Richard: *".Bruno: In that case a multiverse could contain another multiverse, a bit like a black hole could be a door to another universe...." - and:* *"...What surprises me is that apparently comp predicts a single multiverse rather than than multiple multiverses..."* feeling free to fantasize - maybe congruent to the "physical" ways of thinking. Bruno, however, seems to stick to the "practical" worldview using the base of the 'arithmetical' to facilitate 'reasonable' conclusions. If I feel free to meander into fantasieland I would not restrict the features I meet. They may be way out of the 'thinkable'.
Bruno's: *"...It is the technic which makes able to interview, and sum up infinite interviews with the machine talking about itself...."* still restricts his 'infinite' topics WITHIN the human imagination. We have no reception to the 'machine's' beyond-the-human-mind variations. The same applies (in my view) to an anticipation of the "noch nie dagewesen" (=~the absolute NEW?) still imaginable. We are absolutely 'closed-in' into Robert Rosen's "model' of the knowable world. (the reason why I fancy the 'infinite complexity' as the "Everything" ((God?)) of which we only have portions to access - and that, too, in adjusted ways to the capabilities of our present mental development-levels. This is the main reason why I have limited appreciation for past 'wise' opinions coming from similarly limited minds (even if maybe more advanced thinkers than myself). John M On Sat, Dec 21, 2013 at 4:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 20 Dec 2013, at 18:48, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: In that case a multiverse could contain another multiverse, a bit > like a black hole could be a door to another universe. > > Richard: I like that idea because Smolin hypothized and Poplawski > confirmed using GR + spin that black holes yield at least an internal > universe. > > > > Interesting. Wish I could follow this more closely. > > Bruno > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 12:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> Richard, >> >> >> On 20 Dec 2013, at 12:40, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> What surprises me is that apparently comp predicts a single multiverse >> rather than than multiple multiverses. >> >> >> Interesting problem. >> >> Comp predicts only a single multi-dreams, which is the "universal" >> computation made by the UD, or the Sigma_1 complete part of arithmetic. >> I am still not sure if the "material points of view" will give 0, 1, 2, >> ... aleph_0, ... or more multiverses. >> >> A difficulty relies also in the fact that a "multiverse", or even a >> "physical universe" is still not really well defined by the physicists >> themselves. In fact in Everett theory, we might also not be entirely sure >> if there is a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, and such question might >> need the resolution of the quantum gravity question. >> >> With comp, we can say things like that: IF there are n multiverses, THEN >> they cannot interfere statistically and so "you" are in only one of them >> (if not they will comp-interfere), and thus they must be all "small" (= >> not emulating a UD). So, only one multiverse might contain a "physical" >> universal dovetailing. >> Is the quantum vacuum a physical universal dovetailer? >> Is the Everett universal wave a physical universal dovetailer? >> Is the solution of the comp measure problem a physical universal >> dovetailer? Should "nature" compete with the universal dovetailing to win >> the measure competition? >> >> Ah! You make me thinking ... What is really a multiverse? Can we define >> this in ZF, or in ZF+kappa? Would it makes sense to talk of >> alpha-multi-verse for alpha an arbitrary cardinal, or an On-multiverse, >> with On being the class of all cardinals? >> What if the ultimate structure of the physical reality is non well >> founded? That is plausible with comp (despite arithmetic is well founded). >> In that case a multiverse could contain another multiverse, a bit like a >> black hole could be a door to another universe. >> >> Keep in mind that for a computationalist (who is aware of the UDA >> "reversal") (assuming there is no flaw of course) the physical reality is >> the border of the "real" reality where "real" is what the FPI gives for the >> "average" universal (and Löbian) numbers. >> >> You can visualized the UD by a cone of length omega (aleph_zero). Just >> take a program for a UD implemented in a universal game of life pattern. >> Then pile up the planes representing the successive evolving life pattern. >> This gives a digital cone (due to the never ending growing of the life >> pattern emulating the UD), and you can "see" the UD* as an infinite >> tridimensional digital cone. OK? >> >> Now, you can compactify that structure. You identify the planes at 0, 1, >> 2, 3, ... n, places in the infinite piling with 0, 1/2, >> 1/2+1/4, 1/2+1/4+1/8, ..., so that the entire infinite UD* is kept on a >> finite board of lenght 1: just a cone, or its projection: a triangle. OK? >> >> Where is the "physical reality" in that picture? Nowhere, as UD* is >> purely 3p, and physics is purely 1p. Hopefully: 1p-plural (and Everett >> confirms this: our computations are contagious, we cannot *not* share them >> when interacting. But that 1p collective structure must (in comp) emerge at >> the union of all sets of all computations (containing our actual states), >> and this can be described in 3p, and is in the border which appears when we >> do the compactification. >> >> That border, the topside of the cone, or the right side of the triangle >> of length 1, is an hologram, as each sub-branch infinitely often generates >> the UD, and the broder contains the infinite one. It is a bit like the >> border (but on dimension 1) of the Mandelbrot set. The physical realities >> are dense everywhere "there" and they are multiplied in hard to conceive >> magnitude, on that 2-dimensional top (in that representation of UD*). >> Unlike the little mandelbrot sets, they might be non enumerable. >> >> And then you have that things which I tended to hide a little bit, which >> is that the hypostases gives three quantizations, like if there where three >> type of physical realities (would that mean three multiverses? In *some* >> sense to make precise: perhaps). >> Not just sensible matter and intelligible matter (Bp & Dt & p, and Bp & >> Dt, respectively) provides quantization, on the p sigma_1, the soul (Bp & >> p) does too, on the p sigma_1. Apparently Plotinus is right on this: the >> soul seems to be born with a foot already in matter. >> >> I should say more on modal logic and enunciate the theorem of Solovay. >> All what I say comes from the fact that meta-arithmetic can be >> arithmetized, the main discovery of Gödel. It is the technic which embeds >> the "mathematician" in the mathematical reality (indeed in a tiny >> arithmetical part), like Everett embeds the physicist in the physical >> reality (defined by a solution of the SWE). >> It is the technic which makes able to interview, and sum up infinite >> interviews with the machine talking about itself. >> >> Monistic theories cannot not embed the observer in the observed, the >> spectator in the spectacle, the audience in the show. >> >> >> Best, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 20 Dec 2013, at 02:15, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> If it's all just math, what is the unexpected surprise that makes it >>> funny? Is math surprised that its math? >>> >>> >>> It is of course only surprising for those deluded (assuming comp) into >>> thinking that there is some primitive non mathematical reality, like the >>> aristotelian theologian, who believe in a non mathematical primitively >>> physical universe. >>> >>> The real surprise, in the arithmetic internal views, is the existence >>> of the universe (not the fact that it is not a primitive). >>> >>> The absence of X, if proved, would surprise the believers in X, in a >>> same way. >>> >>> "Surprised" is prejudice dependent. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, December 18, 2013 2:07:47 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> http://abstrusegoose.com/544 >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
