On 17 Jan 2014, at 19:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, January 17, 2014 1:03:15 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jan 2014, at 03:11, LizR wrote:
On 17 January 2014 14:17, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Historically, AI researchers did not consider the question of whether
a computer that behaves intelligently was conscious, on the
assumption
that intelligence was observable while consciousness was not and
therefore not a fit subject for scientists.
Hence the Turing test.
Ah! Gosh, if you do all the work, I might as well take some holiday,
except that what I like the most in Holiday is to chat with you! I
am stuck in a paradox!
This makes it a bit
confusing when terms such as strong AI/ weak AI are appropriated by
philosophers such as Searle.
Yes, I was finding it a bit confusing, especially since the first
thing I got on to was Searle's "Strong AI hypothesis" !
Searle fight strongly against Strong AI, and comp. But he mixes the
level of descriptions.
Level of description is smuggled in from non-comp. Comp can't have
any level of description as far as I can tell.
Computer science gives on the contrary a precise definition of
emulation and of the notion of level.
Bruno
My example of the keyboard password is better anyhow. Try as I
might, memorizing the finger movements of a password will not tell
me what the meaning of the password is, From all external accounts
my ability to log in would make me a zombie. Only I would know that
I have no idea what the password is, even though I use it every day.
Craig
It is a case closed, imo, by Hofstadter and Dennett in "Mind's
I" (the book the closer to comp's consequence, but which still
misses the FPI and its importance. Dennett get close though). Searle
confuse levels, in the chinese room.
Bruno
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