On 17 Jan 2014, at 19:24, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
I was not clear. Let me try again.
On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 16 Jan 2014, at 15:18, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Let me first say that I share your opinion of physicalism!
My point is that it is the only opinion available to any self-
referentially correct machines (believing in rationality and some
amount of occam (the amount needed to disbelieve in fairy tales).
As to the empirical evidence of inorganic minds. What behavior
should we look for?
By comp, the behavior (indeed even the subjective experience) is the
same for organic and inorganic mind.
I am inviting you to speculate here. I agree that the behavior will
be the same for organic and inorganic system; all that matters is
that the necessary functionality exist for the computations to
supervene or "run" on the hardware.
My question is about the particularities of the functions that
would be required for a mind. From my study so far, based on your
remarks and reasoning (thank you!) and those of Lou Kauffman, it
seems that a recursively expressible reflexivity function is
necessary.
Define this. careful, in that domain "reflexivity" means []p -> p, or
GÖdel or Löb, and that is incompatible.
What functions does the Löb's theorem require?
I think that Lou's eigenforms are a starting point for
recursively expressible reflexivity, but I am still not able to see
the full expression of in the eigenforms as the P is not
parametrized by the recursion depth. (His eigenforms are very
similar to the Dx = xx formula except that they are parameterizable
in time/recursion depth.
I appreciate very much Kaufmann, especially on knots. "His" eigen form
is the bred of the logicians since Gödel. Your correction on Dx = xx
is of the type 1004 fallacy. As I use that expression to refer to any
form of the second recursion theorem of Kleene.
I ask this with all seriousness, as I have been researching methods
to detect AGI (another way to denote inorganic minds) and have
found that there are, IMHO, very good arguments (particularly by
Goetzel) that have been made that show that we should not expect
AGI to interact via "natural languages" and will not have models of
the world that can be mapped via simple bijections to our models of
the world. Basically, their "physics" are expected to be very
different.
That does not make sense to me. The AGI might have different qualia,
but if it does get the right comp quanta, then the AGI will conclude
that he/it/she is not a machine, which is absurd, or that comp is
wrong, and then it is a zombie!
No, I am asking about the forms of expression that the AGI may have
to "communicate" with each other.
It can have any form, as long as being able to send and receive
signals. I don't see the relevance with the preceding paragraph.
Keep in mind that I am not a philosopher. I explain a result in the
(comp) theology of machines, which is a branch of arithmetic (by the
UDA: that is not obvious at all)..
Bruno
Bruno
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377
Neil Gershenfeld
Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB
Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann
So do I.
He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital
physics. This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I
can repeat the argument, but it is very easy from the UDA.
Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true.
We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60
years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain.
Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical
science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of
theoretical models .... and has been generationally systemically
confused with empirical science.
I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise
criteria how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise
theory of the mind.
You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that
would mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't
see how you could avoid the consequences.
Party’s over.
You talk here a bit like Edgar or other "knower of the Truth".
We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them
put light on how to interpret the experimental data.
Bruno
Cheers
Colin
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in
the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe
.
To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
Kindest Regards,
Stephen Paul King
Senior Researcher
Mobile: (864) 567-3099
stephe...@provensecure.com
http://www.provensecure.us/
“This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the
use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may
contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged,
confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may
be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the
intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use,
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is
strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error,
notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.”
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in
the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe
.
To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
Kindest Regards,
Stephen Paul King
Senior Researcher
Mobile: (864) 567-3099
stephe...@provensecure.com
http://www.provensecure.us/
“This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the
use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may
contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged,
confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may
be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination,
distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly
prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify
sender immediately and delete this message immediately.”
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
