On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/21/2014 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jan 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/20/2014 12:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jan 2014, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/19/2014 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But why should that imply *existence*.
It does not. Unless we believe in the axioms, which is the case
for elementary arithmetic.
But what does "believe in the axioms" mean. Do we really
believe we can *always* add one more? I find it doubtful. It's
just a good model for most countable things. So I can believe
the axioms imply the theorems and that "17 is prime" is a
theorem, but I don't think that commits me to any existence in
the normal sense of "THAT exists".
Because you are chosing the physicalist ostensive definition of
what exists, like Aristotelians, but you beg the question here.
I don't see that you've explained what question I begged. Just
because I define things ostensively does not entail that reject
explanations of their existence - if that's what you are implying.
Fair enough.
The point is that, in that case, you should not say "yes" to the
doctor.
Why not. The doctor is going install a physical prosthetic. As
you've agreed before, it will not be *exactly* like me - but I'm
not exactly the same from day to day anyway.
But you overlook the UDA here. The UDA is the explanation why if
you say yes to the doctor "qua computatio", the physical must be
recovered from arithmetic, in some special way.
But that seems me an example of the misplaced concrete. I have a
lot more confidence in the physical functionality of a well tested
artificial neuron than I have in the UDA. So I may well say "yes"
to the doctor without accepting arithmetical realism, the
mathematical definition of "exists", or the running of a UD.
Of course. If you really believe in a bigger natural number (that we
can't always add one), what you say follows.
(personally I have more confidence in the fact that all natural
numbers have a successor than in any artificial neuron, even if well
tested).
So you criticize AR, but without AR, we can't explain Church thesis,
and the notion of computer become ambiguous. You reject comp, by
rejecting computer science. yes, in that case, even step 8 will not
change your mind. Even step seven is no more valid, in that case.
You can always add magic of course. This can be used for any theory
of physics.
I think your critics can be sum up by the belief that step 8 is non
valid.
I am suspicious that it only proves that a "zero-physics" simulation
is possible in a different world where the physics is simulated too.
I don't understand.
In other words it's conclusion is only valid if the scope is made
arbitrarily large and the MG, in effect, becomes a different world.
In which case you say no to the doctor, and we are a long way from
saying "yes" just by trusting the artificial neuron and glial cells,
like you suggest to be a reason for saying yes without AR.
Bruno
Brent
But step 8 talks about "reality", so it is not purely logical, and
step 8 just shows how ad hoc that move is. It is made equivalent to
the way creationist reason, except it is done for the creation
instead of the creator.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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