On 23 Jan 2014, at 22:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, January 23, 2014 2:18:50 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jan 2014, at 15:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 6:14:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Consider the posts by Craig. He said clearly "no" to that question,
> making his assumption (existence of a primitive sense) coherent. But
> he used his assumption to justify his negation of comp, but that is
> usually invalidated by the fact that machines get the same
conclusion
> than his. His assumption are also quite fuzzy, but there has never
> been any trouble with him, notably because he does never insult or
> patronized others.
>
>
>
> Thanks Bruno, I appreciate that. For the record, I would submit that
> your ability to see your way through the stereotypical machine
> beliefs personally suggests that you are setting a double standard
> whereby a particular machine (namely you, or anyone who subscribes
> to comp) is exempt from "the fact that machines get the same
> conclusion".
What makes you believe any machine, including me, can be exempted from
that?
It would be exempted for someone who is certain that he is this or
that machine. But no machine can be in that state, when consistent.
Isn't the thesis that no machine can be in that state a form of
certainty? If we were to say 'the first symptom of being a witch is
being sure that we aren't a witch', then we are effectively saying
that we can be objectively certain about the objectively unreliable
nature of our subjective objectivity.
> It's a bit of a loaded question.
Yes. Even diabolically loaded. There is here some philosophical trap.
We navigate on the verge of inconsistency.
But this is also the place where the math will show the consistency
and the necessity.
But we should not assume that the math has access to the aesthetic
qualities of awareness.
But some part of math can have relative access to such aesthetics,
when we assume comp.
So, those saying "yes" to the doctor does this or similar assumption.
> If I agree with comp then I am in some sense more than machine,
Which I sum up often by: IF my body is a machine, my soul is not.
With body = the 3-I, and soul = the 1-I.
I was thinking of the sense that by agreeing with comp, I am rising
above the belief that you are saying machines have about comp being
untrue. I'm becoming smarter than the average machine who won't
believe comp.
No, because comp might be false. You might be deluded. Saying "yes"
does not make you smarter. may be just more courageous or something,
because it needs some fight with your first person instinctive feeling.
> but if I claim my own authority independent of comp, then my claim
> is false by comp.
Absolutely not.
All I said is that your claim cannot be use against comp in a valid
way. But your claim remain correct. Your soul is not a machine.
How is my soul not a machine if it is reducible to the actions of
machines?
The soul is not reducible to the actions by and in machine. In Bp & p,
the "& p" connects the machine with the arithmetical truth, and truth
is everything but mechanical.
My point is that this does not refute comp, because with comp it is a
theorem: all machine's soul are not machine.
Then what are they, and what are they doing with machines?
A bridge between machine's belief and truth.
It means that you are introspectively correct. You say something true
about you, but not about the machines when you deprived them of a
soul.
I don't deprive them of a soul, I deprive them of autonomy.
You make your case worst. You agree they have a soul, but you treat
them like slaves. At least the Spanish agreed that IF the Indians have
a soul, then we can't use them as slaves ...
Like Bugs Bunny. It's not a question of whether BB has a soul or not
- in a sense, he is a record of a character which could be
considered more representative of soul than an ordinary
personality...he is a cartoon exaggeration of personality within our
experience. What Bugs Bunny lacks is a genuinely proprietary
perspective. Bugs Bunny is a picture of something in our mind. A
machine is similarly a four dimensional picture in our mind - an
expectation that we can decide whether we want to project onto the
function or form of the machine or not.
You will not help me to appreciate your point when comparing a
machine, which has a very rich notion of self, and Bugs Bunny, which
has nothing like that.
The wonderful things is that if you identify soul and the knower or
the first person pov, using the oldest definition (Theaetetus,
Plotinus, the true believer), you get, thanks to incompleteness
exactly that.
You get a machine's soul,
I think just the opposite. You get the collective absence of all
soul which all machines potentially share. The machine's soul
equivalent is real estate within Nous, not the royal inhabitants of
the Psyche or even the sub-personal peasants whose bodies are our
cells.
which is even worst that not being a
machine, it is even a non nameable, by the machine, entity.
To anticipate an answer to David Nyman, it might be the universal
conscious first person. A common inner God shared by all good willing
machines.
I think that it is the universal unconscious 0p unperson.
Well, that looks like the outer God. It is just an open problem for me
if It is conscious or not.
A common exo-gnostic anesthesia shared by all synchronized logics.
You do have some charming talent in writing, but if it made me read
and sometimes appreciate your posts, especially when they are
phenomenologically close to to the 1p-discourse of the machine,
sometimes it can also be too much pretty to be convincing.
Bruno
>
> I see it the other way around. If sense is primary, then logic is
> the extension of sense into the unsensed. It is mechanized
> inference, aka, computation. It uses the 'space between' sense to
> infer measurement, and as such, does indeed access a kind of
> interstitial Platonic matrix of eternal truths...however, in my
> view, they are only truths about how sense interacts with itself
> from a distance - very close to sense, but not quite as fundamental.
> In this way, computation is something like the 'perfect imperfect' -
> the imposter, an emulator and digitizer of proprietary content into
> public, anonymous 'films' of sense.
Because you see only the body. I think.
I think that I'm just observing and interpreting the actual evidence
of how mechanism manifests in reality rather than assuming
mechanism's theory of itself.
> From that perspective, I think that it makes sense that logic
> mistakes itself for sense, so that the fact that logic itself would
> reflect the assumptions that those with logical minds tend to make
> is consistent.
I hope you follow the modal thread. Eventually, that is all what the
math will be about.
I have no problem with your theory, as long as my sun in law can go in
your restaurant.
He can go in a simulation of my restaurant, any time.
I have never said that your theory is not correct, just that your use
of it against comp was not valid. Indeed, your theory will match the
third machine hypostase.
Comp, like the Gödel sentence, is a bit diabolical, because it
explains that you cannot really believe in comp, from your first
person perspective. People who find comp obvious (like many
materialist) get it wrong. It is truly unbelievable, and the more you
understand it, the less easy you can believe in it.
I don't take issue with its unbelievability though. My skepticism
stems only from comparison with the sense primitive making a more
complete framework. I think that it is not diabolical because it
confounds us, or confounds common sense, but just because it
amputates the very thing it is trying to explain, and then sells us
on the amputation.
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
