On Friday, January 24, 2014 12:31:33 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 24 January 2014 01:15, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > > > On Thursday, January 23, 2014 5:39:08 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > >> > >> On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can > >> > differ > >> > from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any > mereological > >> > Systems argument. > >> > > >> > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of > >> > keystrokes > >> > rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your > >> > password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing > >> > (something > >> > with a #r5f^ in it…?). > >> > > >> > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing > and > >> > copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but > it > >> > is > >> > an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the > >> > ‘human > >> > keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists > only > >> > of > >> > theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good > or > >> > sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand > >> > what > >> > the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in > with > >> > whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined. > >> > > >> > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public > >> > communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire > >> > paragraphs > >> > or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we > do > >> > not > >> > have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the > >> > public-facing > >> > computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be > >> > communicated > >> > in general, from the top down, and the inside out. > >> > >> I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display > >> properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no > >> way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that. > > > > > > I don't have a problem with the idea that a "system" could DISPLAY > > properties that are not obvious from EXAMINING its "parts", but you > overlook > > that DISPLAYING and EXAMINING are functions of consciousness only. If > they > > were not, then consciousness would be superfluous. If my brain could > examine > > the display of the body's environment, then it would, and the presence > or > > absence of perceptual experience would not make any difference. > > > > Systems and parts are defined by level of description - scales and > scopes of > > perception and abstracted potential perception. They aren't primitively > > real. A machine is not a machine in its own eyes, but our body is an > > expression of a single event which spans a human lifetime. A person is > > another expression of that event. The "system" of a person does not > emerge > > from the activity of the body parts, as the entire coherence of the body > is > > as a character within relativistically scoped perceptual experiences. > > > > I don't think that I believe, I think that I understand. I think that > you do > > not understand what I mean, but are projecting that onto me, and > therefore > > have assigned a straw man to take my place. It is your straw man > projection > > who must believe. > > > > Craig > > Tell me what you believe so we can be clear: > > My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese > Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand > Chinese. Have I got this wrong? >
The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not related to its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that forms and functions can understand things. I see forms and functions as one of the effects of experience, not as a cause of them. I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are simpler: 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the letters on the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters, indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated with it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not necessarily produce any or all qualia. 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the suits, their colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of the players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any aesthetic qualities to simulate any card game. 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like basketball is that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the human intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them logically. Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in that the real challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A machine has no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It doesn't get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish something that it cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each move would be subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end can never result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker pieces getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no Cinderella Story in real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can be no difference between theory and reality in an information-theoretic universe. So no, I do not "believe" this, I understand it. I do not think that the Chinese Room is valid because wholes must be identical to their parts. The Chinese Room is valid because it can (if you let it) illustrate that the difference between understanding and processing is a difference in kind rather than a difference in degree. Technically, it is a difference in kind going one way (from the quantitative to the qualitative) and a difference in degree going the other way. You can reduce a sport to a game (as in computer basketball) but you can't turn a video game into a sport unless you bring in hardware that is physical/aesthetic rather than programmatic. Which leads me to: 4. You can't recharge your cell phone with a program. Again, we can make a cartoon or a program in which avatars are recharged with information that we imagine is like 'energy' or 'health', or we could just program them to have infinite energy, but that can't be translated out of the context of representation. Like an Escher painting with realistic looking staircases that are empirically impossible, the representational context is much more forgiving than the presentational context. Properties like gravity or thermodynamic irreversibility are not necessary in a picture or program. Neither are smells, pain, feeling, effort, ownership, etc. We can use programs to extend experience, but we can never replace experience itself with a program. Thanks, Craig > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
