On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:17:46 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 4 February 2014 09:29, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > >> > Does it? You still haven't explained why bodies emit utterances that > >> > appear > >> > to refer to this putative epiphenomenon. Or are you saying that > they're > >> > not > >> > really emitting such utterances or making such references? They're > just > >> > physical systems going about their lawful physical business, but > somehow > >> > that evokes a physically-undetectable extra something-or-other. And > it's > >> > only in terms of this extra something-or-other that utterances seem > to > >> > exist > >> > that, in turn, only seem so to refer. Is that what it boils down to? > >> > >> It's because you're stuck on the idea that consciousness is something > >> extra and optional. > > > > > > Those weren't rhetorical questions. I was asking you for your views. I > don't > > think I'm stuck on any idea in particular. I'm more interested in trying > to > > discern precisely what is entailed by framing a problem in a particular > way. > > My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's meaningless to > ask why bodies emit utterances referring to the epiphenomenon. > > >> If you could see that it was logically entailed by > >> certain physical phenomena or computations you wouldn't have a > >> problem. > > > > > > How right you are. Do you see this? If you do, perhaps you could explain > to > > me how it is so entailed. > > I think this paper by David Chalmers shows just that: > > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html > > It shows that it is impossible to make a functional brain replacement > that does not also replicate any associated consciousness. >
Which only means that is it impossible to make a brain replacement that is 100% functional. We can list endless examples of functions which can be simulated without their being viable replacements. A picture of fire simulates the visual presence of the function that is fire but not the thermal presence. Likewise, a human presence can be simulated by a 4D interactive picture without there being any replacement of the presence itself. If you could make a fully functional replacement of a human experience, then you would have to include subjective qualities as functions, in which case it is tautological to say that a functional replacement of consciousness would have to be function consciously. Consciousness doesn't have to be function though, even though *human* qualities of consciousness depend on functions to persist. Functions are an appearance within consciousness. Every function can have a level beneath them which is sensory-motive rather than mechanical. Craig > >> It would be like agonising over why an object in which every > >> point on its perimeter is equidistant from the centre has the quality > >> of roundness rather than squareness or nothingness; and how it could > >> be that roundness has no separate causal efficacy over and above what > >> can be explained in terms of the physicality of the object possessing > >> this property. > > > > > > Yes, that would certainly follow if all the relevant phenomena could be > > exhaustively explained by the correct level of physical emergence. Do > you > > presently have a view as to what that might be, or is this a case of > "shut > > up and wait"? > > It might never be adequately explained yet still be true. I understand > the proof showing that sqrt(2) is irrational even though I can't say I > understand irrational numbers in the same way as I understand integers > and fractions. > > >> > By the way, I'm not really sure what the term epiphenomenon is > supposed > >> > to > >> > convey in this context. Is it indeed supposed to be a sort of one-way > >> > dualism in which, as I suggest above, a genuinely novel > >> > something-or-other > >> > is evoked by physical behaviour but cannot reciprocally affect it > (and > >> > so > >> > cannot be detectable by it). Or is it really a form of cryptic > >> > eliminativism > >> > in which, in the final analysis, there is no additional > >> > something-or-other > >> > at all? > >> > >> I don't think these terms make any substantive difference. Whether my > >> consciousness can be replicated by a computer, for example, is an > >> important question and it is not dependent on whether under some use > >> of the English language it is correct to say that consciousness can be > >> eliminated. > > > > > > Absolutely. If indeed my consciousness had been satisfactorily > replicated by > > a computational prosthetic it would be very foolish of me to complain > that > > it had been eliminated. > > > > Anyway, it would appear, that like Brent, you were using the term > > epiphenomenon to mean some emergent phenomenon that is fully entailed by > > canonical physical causation, like temperature. If that's the case, I > agree > > with Brent that there would be no remaining motive to differentiate it > > categorically from any other such canonical phenomenon of emergence. > > Yes > > > By the way, if you think that consciousness may be that kind of > phenomenon, > > does that imply that you reject any categorical 3p/1p distinction? I ask > > because I tend to agree with Bruno (and Brent, if I've understood his > most > > recent comment) that the prize at the end of this road is a completed > theory > > of the physical correlates of self-reported conscious phenomena. But > many > > people take the view that after this prize is attained, there is still a > > "remainder problem" that doesn't seem so problematical with temperature > or > > other emergent phenomena of the canonical kind. On the other hand, if > one > > wishes to deny that anything remains to be accounted for after the > physical > > correlates are explained it would be reasonable to describe one's > position > > as eliminative with respect to any such remainder. > > I still think it is valid to make the 1p/3p distinction. The emergent > phenomenon of consciousness has an aspect that you only get if you are > it. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
