On 2/10/2014 7:15 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 15:59, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
On 2/10/2014 5:35 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 13:42, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/10/2014 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/9/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even on his argument, that nobody understand but him, against step 3?
Then I
invite you to attempt to explain it to us.
I think I understand it. Asking the question "which will you be" in
the MW
experiment is ambiguous because "you" is duplicated.
But that question is John Clark's invention. I never ask it. The
question
asked is about your FIRST PERSON expectation about 1-your future. It
cannot be
ambiguous when we assume comp.
Sure it is. What does "your first person expectation" refer to. Does
it ask
what will your 1-p experience be? Or does it ask what is your 1-p
feeling about
where you will be?
Consider a quantum measurement instead. Do we have an expectation of 1p
experience
when we check if a photon's been reflected or transmitted? We assign a
probability
to each outcome, surely? Why is Bruno's duplicator different?
There are two different people you can ask, "How did the experiment come
out."
Well, likewise with the quantum version. In fact there are two versions of you who can
ask them (i.e. if you accept the MWI, what's the problem?)
(We seem to have been around in a loop on this about 100 times...)
I agree and I'm willing to take it as hypothetical that it doesn't make a
difference, at least till I understand the whole argument. But I suspect
that it
could. It might require that in step a whole world be created and that I
think
could make a difference.
The point is that if we take the assumptions of comp, then quantum duplication,
hypothetical matter transmitter duplication, and living from day to day ALL involve the
same amount of (or lack of) continuity.
In other words, all types of existence appear to be equally "Heraclitean" and I'm not
sure why Bruno's thought experiment should be treated any differently to the
nonduplicated and the quantum-duplicated versions. He's just using it to point out the
somewhat disjointed nature of normal existence by putting it into a hypothetical
situation where we can more easily think about the consequences.
The claimed consequence is that consciousness can be instantiated by a computation which
requires no physical events. But I think what is shown is that there can be a world
including conscious beings which does not require physical events in our world, i.e. they
can be merely arithmetical or Turing machince "events". In other words it is possible to
simulate a world with conscious beings. But that's not so surprising and doesn't imply
that physics in this world is derivative from arithmetic (but it doesn't imply the
contrary either).
It's all very well having reservations that X might make a difference, but as Bruno
keeps saying, show him where he's gone wrong so he can stop worrying about comp and
spend his time keeping bees instead!
And I keep saying show me a significant prediction (not retrodiction) of comp.
Brent
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