On 26 February 2014 04:51, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> The point of this is that if the brain is responsible for >> consciousness it is absurd to suppose that the brain's behaviour could >> be replaced with a functional analogue while leaving out any >> associated qualia. This constitutes a proof of functionalism, and of >> its subset computationalism if it is further established that physics >> is computable. > > > ? > > On the contrary if computationalism is correct the physics cannot be > entirely computable, some observable cannot be computed (but it might be no > more that the "frequency-operator", like in Graham Preskill. But still, we > must explain why physics seems computable, despite it result of FMP on non > computable domains).
If you start with the assumption that the physics relevant to brain function is not computable then computationalism is false: it would be impossible to make a machine that behaves like a human, either zombie or conscious. > Also,you are not using "functionalism" in its standard sense, which is > Putnam names for comp (at a non specified level assumed to be close to > neurons). > > What do you mean by function? If you take all functions (like in set > theory), then it seems to me that functionalism is trivial, and the relation > between consciousness and a process, even natural, become ambiguous. > > But if you take all functions computable in some topos or category, of > computability on a ring, or that type of structure, then you *might* get > genuine generalization of comp. What I mean by functionalism is that the way the brain processes information, its I/O behaviour, is what generates mind. This implies multiple realisability of mental states, insofar as the same information processing could be done by another machine. If the machine is a digital computer then functionalism reduces to computationalism. If the brain utilises non-computable physics then you won't be able to reproduce its function (and the mind thus generated) with a digital computer, so computationalism is false. However, that does not necessarily mean that functionalism is false, since you may be able to implement the appropriate brain function through some other means. For example, if it turns out that a digital implementation of the brain fails because real numbers and not approximations are necessary, it may still be possible to implement a brain using analogue devices. >> I don't think we have to settle for Bruno's modest >> assertion that comp is a matter of faith. > > > It has to be, from a theoretical point of view. Assuming you are correct > when betting on comp, you cannot prove, even to yourself (but your 1p does > not need that!) that you did survive a teleportation. > > Of course I take "proof" in a rather strong literal sense. Non comp might be > consistent with comp, like "PA is inconsistent" is consistent with PA. What can be proved is that if consciousness is due to the brain then replicating brain function in some other substrate will also replicate its consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
