On 04 Mar 2014, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:27:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Mar 2014, at 21:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Why don't we see such a (meta) link in our own languages?
Because we duplicate too slowly, unlike amoeba, which have not the
cognitive abilities to exploit this.
This entails that in natural language we use the same indexical
term "I" for both the 3-I and the 1-I. We say "I lost a tooth" ("3-
I") , and "I feel pain in my mouth (1-I)". Only teleportation and
duplication, or deep reflexion on belief and knowledge, makes
clear the difference. It appears clearly in Theaetetus, and in
other fundamental texts.
When we say "I lost a tooth" what we mean is "In my experience it
seems like I lost a tooth". It is still 1-I. We may wake up and
find that experience was a dream, in which case we say "I didn't
lose a tooth" but mean "In my experience it seems like my previous
experience of losing a tooth was a dream",
Funny but irrelevant. Like Clark can always avoid a question on the
1-views, by jumping out of his body and adding a 3 (passing from
some 1-1-1 view to a 3-1-1-1 view for example), you can always add a
1 on any view, like you do here. But in the argument we were
assuming the 3p view at the start.
I'm not adding a 1 view, I'm giving a literal description of the
phenomenon. There is no expectation of 3p unless that expectation is
provided by the 1p.
that is what I meant by adding the 1-p view.
We were not assuming the 3p view at the start though,
That is why your position is akin to solipsism.
since I think that the 3p view is only realized as a (Bp-x/Bp)(x/Bp
+x/Bp), never as a stand-alone perspective.
So what does stand alone?
Instead of seeing it in terms of Bp & p, I see it as something like
Bp & Bp^e (where e is Euler's number).
???
Yes. My view is that there is no "p" other than as a representation
within some "Bp".
That is a form of solipsism.
Truth is a measure of the length of the trail of experiences leading
back closer and closer to the capacity for sense itself. Short
trails present the truth of superficial, disconnected sensations.
Long trails present profoundly unifying states of consciousness.
To do science, we have to bet on something on which we can agree, and
which is supposed to be independent on us.
Keep in mind that I have no problem with your theory, especially that
it is consistent with the machine's 1-view. I have a problem only with
you using your theory to refute computationalism. It is non valid, if
only because your theory is, basically, equivalent to the machine's 1-
view.
There is no p, only a tendency toward stability across nested
histories of experience as the accumulate.
If there is no p, there is no truth, and we waste our time when
doing research.
No, there is truth, but it is not a separate perfect thing, it's
more like the mass of experience. Truth is a measure of how much
sense is made of what makes sense already.
This is a solipsistic vision of truth. You really talk like the
machine"s "universal soul" (S4Grz).
I begin to think I waste my time trying to get you back to research
instead of your hopelessly negative and destructive quasi-racist
personal reification.
I can see your research as hopelessly naive and potentially
destructive as well, as to me, it conflates the personal with a
reified impersonal and presents a quasi-racist arithmetic supremacy.
I wouldn't hold that against you though. You could still be right, I
just happen to think that my view makes more sense in defining the
basic points.
I have yet to see a theory. You assume sense, you assume some
physicalness (at least your refer to it a lot without explaining what
is when you assume only sense), so you assume what I estimate (and
argue) that we have to explain.
You are not trying to make a scientific theory. You just seem to
defend a personal opinion, which is negative on a class of entities,
without us ever being able to get a reason why, except your opinion.
Edgar,
In this list we are open minded and basically agnostic, we don't a
priori assume god, matter, universe, numbers, or whatever, and then
try theories by making clear the assumptions.
The a priori assumption is that you can have a sensible strategy to
deflate your assumptions by making a priori explicit sense of them.
That is accepted at the meta-level for *any* scientific theory. You do
the same with the term "sense". The difference is that many people
actually agree on the assumptions, in the case of comp, and they are
clear enough to learn from them.
In all cases, the first implicit assumption is sense itself. Sense
of arithmetic, sense of machines, sense of sense, sense of
self...all of that comes later.
Sense is not an assumption. That does not make sense. If you complain
about toothache to your dentist, saying something like "I feel pain",
you would not be happy if your dentist answers by "that is your
assumption". We can feel sense, we never assume it. Then I want an
explanation of the relation between sense and our bodies/universe, but
you don't address the point.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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