On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote:
Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the first-
person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could
you explain how?
In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in
staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to
copy a piece of matter.
Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is
already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should
be defined by something like a non distinguishability with respect to
some set of instruments.
Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer
description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own
substitution level. At that level, the matter is no more made of
subpart, but is undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent
of such details, and *you* diffuse on all the possible
"subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all universal machines are
somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p for the "length of
the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). How could you
clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is not a real
thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily fuzzy
when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see there
is only an average of the many possible computations below our (first
person plural) substitution level.
OK?
Bruno
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