On 5/11/2014 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, the rest follows, but the negation of the rest follows too, unless, like Peter Jones, you add a criterion of primitive physical existence to what is needed for consciousness. But then the movie graph can show that they attribute a magical role to that primitive matter. The idea, for them, is that there is a primitive matter, and that "the primitive character" is not Turing emulable.
But if the entangled and holistic character of the world requires that the Turing emulation extend to essentially all of it then "primitive matter" just means "exists in the emulation". Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real". That's why I think the MGA doesn't prove what you think it does. It is still the case that something playing the role of "primitive matter - per Peter Jones" is necessary in every world, and that role is to pick out what exists from what doesn't.
Brent
Still, they say "yes" to the doctor, but only because their artificial brain will be made of primitive matter. Unlike Craig, they don't ask for special matter like carbon, but they do ask for some primitive matter. They might ask for some God instead, of course. It is almost a use of "matter" as a god for creating a gap in the explanation, and if primitive matter existed, they can make that logical point. We cannot prove them logically wrong, but with the MGA we can shows them to be close to non-sense, especially if you can distinguish the evidence of the reality of matter with (impossible) evidence for primitive matter.
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