On 09 Jul 2014, at 03:51, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/8/2014 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
I still can't see how the computation can know that it's got a real
world to relate to, rather than a replay of the inputs recorded
previously. Which as far as I know is all the MGA relies on.
I can't see how a conscious digital computer programme being
started in the same state as the first time around, and having the
same inputs replayed to it as before, would not be just as
conscious as it was the first time around. Either it's conscious
as it was before, OR it wasn't conscious the first time, OR there
is some weird supernatural stuff going on that somehow makes a
difference. (This isn't the point at which I have problems with
the MGA.)
And you're irritated because I don't take a definite position. ;-)
Not exactly. It's because you appear to take a definite position,
speaking out loudly and forcefully in support of it - then back
down when anyone points out that you've done so. The fact
that it's always the same position is a bit of a giveaway, though.
It's a position which I think shows some gaps in comp. But that
doesn't mean I have my own TOE.
I insist that comp is not presented as a solution, but as making two
times more difficult the mind-body problem.
Then the math part shows how hard it would be to use that to defeat
mechanism, as the machine can already show a part of the solution of
the "matter problem". She explains also why for the consciousness and
true part, some gap are simply not 3p sharable, and some might even be
not first person accessible (or at least that is not yet clear and we
can formulate the questions).
Comp is rampant in the human mind since he build tools, and comp get
precise mathematically with the discovery of the universal numbers/
machines. It is a rather seemingly innocent hypothesis in biology and
physics, but it is a strong hypothesis in theology which leads to that
"problematic" reversal, but which offers the math to tackle it, and
even test it experimentally.
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
