On 10 July 2014 13:48, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
> It proves that Bruno's MGA doesn't dispense with physics.  When
> instantiating consciousness it's necessary to either allow the
> consciousness to act within our physical world or to provide another
> computed world within which it can act.
>

Or provide inputs which give the appearance of a world, yes. Otherwise you
have a consciousness that is in sensory isolation (although it could still
dream).


> In either case the physics is necessary to the consciousness - to avoid
> the problem of the rock that computes everything.
>

The rock wouldn't compute *everything*, not being a UD with infinite time,
but it might compute some things. I'm not sure why this is a problem,
however. Can you explain why?


> I don't think Bruon actually claims to get rid of physics anyway, it just
> sounds that way sometimes when he's being short, but then it's taken as a
> refutation of materialism.
>

I'm not sure about physics. I think the point of the MGA is that matter
isn't primary? (As I've already mentioned, I'm not 100% au fait with the
MGA.)


> I take it as an argument for monism; physics is necessary for
> consciousness
>

I'm not sure what this means. Comp assumes that computation is necessary
for consciousness, and in practice, for us to carry out computation
requires physics to support it, of course - but that doesn't mean it's
*necessary* for computation. Computation might be able to exist in
Numberland, or so I'm told.


> (it's just not necessary that physics be fundamental, whatever that means).
>

It means it doesn't emerge from anything else. But if physics isn't primary
then there's no argument anyway, because as far as I can tell comp seems
quite happy with non-primary physics.

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