On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 4:25 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:04, meekerdb wrote: > >> Yet that seems to be what Quentin requires in order to say to instances >>>> of the MG compute the same function. Knowing the universal number or >>>> knowing the function is like the problem of knowing all the correct >>>> counterfactuals. >>>> >>> >>> >>> The MG is supposed to have been made at some right substitution level, >>> by us, by chance (whatever), then (and here I am not sure of Quentin's >>> wording, but each computation at some level is emulated "in parallel" at >>> infinitely many coarse grained level in arithmetic, that looks like more >>> primitive computations. >>> To give an example, imagine a Lisp program computing a factorial >>> function. You have a well defined computation in term of the stepping >>> (tracing) function associated to an interpreter Lisp and the input >>> (factorial 5), say. >>> As Lisp is a universal number, that *counts* as a computation. >>> But then imagine the computation of the Lisp program emulating a boolean >>> Graph (Nor gates and their link and delays) emulating a Z80 processor, >>> emulating itself a Lisp interpreter computing (factorial 5) with the same >>> algorithm as above. >>> Does that comp for a computation of (factorial 5). It does. Is it the >>> same computation? Not really. It is a different path in the UD*. If that >>> process incarnate the conscious flux, then both does, but one if (by >>> construction) at the simplest right level (program in Lisp computing fact >>> 5), and the other is, notably, emulating a lower level, that is the Boolean >>> graph of the Z80 processor. >>> >> >> Are they the same because they both compute 5!; even if they used >> different algorithms? >> > > > No. If they use different algorithm, the function computed is the same, > but the computation differs. But in the above case, I suppose it is the > same algorithm, but we look at the implementation at a lower level. Again > the computation differ at that lower level, and does not differ at the > higher level. In the UD*, this will correspond to different phi_i(j)^n, and > thus different computations, but equivalent from the "point of view of the > factorial" (say). > > Bruno > > That suggests the concept of Computation Paths (CP). And that in cases where two different CPs find the same number, the CPs form a feedback loop; hence the arithmetic is quickly self-referential; and prime numbers are not self-referential, an indication of their importance.. Richard > > > > >> >>> And, yes, knowing the universal number and its data, you know, or can >>> derive, the counterfactuals. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Comp says that there is a level of description of myself such that >>>>>>> those computation *at the correct level" "carries my consciousness". >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> There's where I agree with JKC. You keep fudging what "comp" means. >>>>>> The above is *not* the same as betting that the doctor can give you a >>>>>> physical brain prosthesis that maintains your consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see this. Please explain. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think the level description would have to include not only you but >>>> your "world". >>>> >>> >>> >>> Well, I agree, that is why we need to distinguish []p and []p & <>p, and >>> []p & p. >>> >>> Universal numbers can justify their own incompleteness and they can bet, >>> and intuit, the thing with respect to which it is incomplete. >>> >>> The []p is just a believer. The " & <>p" nuance is equivalent with >>> giving him a world satisfying p. The " & p" nuance consists in keeping >>> intact the relation between belief and truth (or "God", or "Real world", >>> etc.). >>> >>> The math shows that such nuances obeys different, but related, laws. >>> >>> >>> >>> So I could say "yes" to the doctor even though I don't think the >>>> computational brain he installs in me is sufficient, by itself, to >>>> instantiate my consciousness. >>>> >>> >>> Sure, me too. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> But Brent, and Peter Jones, adds that the computation have to be >>>>>>> done by a "real thing". >>>>>>> This is a bit like either choosing some particular universal number >>>>>>> pr, and called it "physical reality", and add the axioms that only the >>>>>>> phi_pr computations counts: the phi_pr (j)^n. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Peter, like me, questions the existence of numbers as any >>>>>> more than elements fo language. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This is conventionalism. I consider that this view is refuted by >>>>> number theory implicitly, and by mathematical logic explicitly. The >>>>> existence of not of infinitely many prime number twins is everythi,g but >>>>> conventional. With comp, the existence of your dreams in arithmetic, and >>>>> their relative proportions, are not conventional. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So it is not like choosing a universal number, it's saying that some >>>>>> things exist and some don't. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Define "exist". If you say "exists physically" then you beg the >>>>> question, and I will ask you to define "physics". >>>>> >>>> >>>> Define "exists". >>>> >>> >>> See the preceding post. The TOE derived from the mechanist reincarnation >>> belief, needs only to agree with the first order standard definition, >>> mainly that a theory proves that something exists having some property P >>> when the theory verifies (proves) P for some object. It is the rule A(x) >>> -> B / ExA(x) -> B, (useful in more general setting), or more simply >>> the classical A(n) / ExA(x). >>> >> >> But that begs the question of whether the axioms are true. It is just >> "existence" relative to some axioms and rules of inference. Isn't that why >> you include &<>p...to assume the truth of the axioms in some world? >> >> >>> Then the points of view are definable, either directly in arithmetic, or >>> indirectly, in term of precise , yet non definable in arithmetic, >>> collection of numbers). Comp makes the use of computer science handy to >>> make all this precise. >>> >> >> One can give a precise description of a unicorn, but that doesn't make it >> exist. >> >> >>> Then, each points of view defines its own notion of existence, and they >>> are captured formally (at the meta-level) by the modal existence, like >>> []Ex[]P(x), etc. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, this would just select (without argument) >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It's based on observation not axiomatic inference. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is explain in the comp theory. Observation is an internal >>>>> modality of the arithmetical truth. >>>>> >>>> >> That I would like to learn more about. >> >> You are using some "real existence" fuzzy notion to make a reasoning >>>>> invalid, in the same way that a creationist can say that "Evolution >>>>> Theory" >>>>> needs a God-of-the-gap. >>>>> >>>> >> I don't see the parallel. We can presumably agree on whether or not >> something physically exists, whether we can interact with it by perception. >> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> a special sub-universal dovetailing among (any) universal >>>>>>> dovetailing. The only "force" here is that somehow the quantum Everet >>>>>>> wave, >>>>>>> seen as such a phi_pr do solve the measure problem (accepting Gleason >>>>>>> theorem does its job). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But just choosing that phi_pr does not solve the mind-body problem, >>>>>>> only the body problem in a superficial way (losing the non justifiable >>>>>>> parts notably). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or they make that physical reality non computable (as comp needs, >>>>>>> but they conjecture that it differs from the non (entirely) computable >>>>>>> physics that we can extract from arithmetic (with comp). But then it is >>>>>>> just a statement like "your plane will not fly". Let us make the test, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> up to now it works. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I'm willing to accept your argument as an hypothesis. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comp is the hypothesis. the argument is not. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But it seems to me that it proves that consciousness and physics >>>>>> necessarily complement one another. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It is more than that. It makes physics the analog of a surface of what >>>>> is real independent of me (the mind of the universal machine) which is >>>>> more >>>>> like a volume having that physical surface as a border. >>>>> >>>> >> Sounds like a good metaphor, but what exactly does it mean and how do you >> show it? >> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Starting from arithmetic you must solve both the mind problem and the >>>>>> body problem at the same time. I don't see that you've made psychology >>>>>> more fundamental than physics. You've made arithmetic more fundamental. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ARITHMETIC ==> NUMBER's PSYCHOLOGY ==> CONSCIOUSNESS ==> MATTER >>>>> APPEARANCE ===> PHYSICS. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree with Brent, and I think everybody agree, when he says that >>>>>>> reducing does not eliminate. But we can't use that to compare >>>>>>> consciousness/neurons to temperature/molecules-kinetic. In that later >>>>>>> case >>>>>>> we reduce a 3p high level to a 3p lower level. And indeed, this does not >>>>>>> eliminate temperature. But in the case of consciousness, we have >>>>>>> consciousness which is 1p, and neurons which are 3p. Here, the whole >>>>>>> 3p, be >>>>>>> it the arithmetical or physical reality fails (when taken as a complete >>>>>>> explanation). The higher level 1p notions are not just higher 3p >>>>>>> description, it is the intimate non justifiable (and infinite) part of a >>>>>>> person, which wonderfully enough provably becomes a non-machine, and a >>>>>>> non >>>>>>> nameable entity, when we apply the definition of Theaetetus definition >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> the machine. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But what does it mean to "apply a definition to a machine". And why >>>>>> should we apply *that* definition, which is far from axiomatic. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The accepted axiomatic is T or S4, that is []p -> p (with or without >>>>> []p -> [][]p). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> machine's have their "[]" well defined, and to apply the Theatetus' >>>>> definition consist in define knowledge of p by []p & p. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But you equivocate on []. Sometimes is means "provable (from some >>>> axioms...Peano?)" and sometimes it means "believes". >>>> >>> >>> >>> It means provable by any "rich enough" machine. I limit myself to >>> machine having correct arithmetical beliefs, and their arithmetically >>> sounds extensions. >>> >> >> But you assume it "knows" *all* provable theorems - which cannot be true >> of any human being. >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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