On 18 Jul 2014, at 16:54, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
So therefore, there is a 'pre-existing' program, embedded in comp,
in maths, that emulates a 'conscious observer' or have I driven your
explanation, into a ditch??
No, you are right, except that your way of talking might be
misleading. All you need to accept is the axiom of Robinson
arithmetic. Then the infinitely many programs and their executions
exist in the same sense that prime numbers or relatively prime numbers
exist. And the reasoning shows that we don't need any other notion of
existence. So the physical laws emerge as appearances in machines'
mind and consciousness, and this in a completely precise ay, making it
possible to test the computationalist hypothesis.
Bruno
With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of
computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs
the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed
done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your
inside first person points of view.
I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but
"emulation" and "computation" are concept definable in arithmetic,
or equivalent.
It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 6:56 am
Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch
On 17 Jul 2014, at 21:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation?
Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM
(computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the
assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in
the step 0 of the UD Argument.
With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of
computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs
the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed
done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your
inside first person points of view.
I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but
"emulation" and "computation" are concept definable in arithmetic,
or equivalent.
It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm
Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch
On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> Computationalism is contradictory?
No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but "comp" is.
What difference do you se between comp and computationalism?
Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM
(computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the
assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in
the step 0 of the UD Argument.
You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you
believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start
reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA.
I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of
comp given that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone
understanding why though).
To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird.
Tell me the difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I
provide a weaker version than usual (through the existence of a
substitution level, without putting any bound on it), and more
precise, by defining "computer" with Church thesis.
Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might
have judged before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a
difference between comp and computationalism. (and it does
contradict your agreement with step one, which by definition makes
you understand what comp is).
Bruno
John K Clark
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