Oops, just discover this unread post. Sorry.
On 22 Jan 2015, at 17:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 22 January 2015 at 08:22, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Because with sufficiently big infinity in both mind and matter, you
can a priori singularize the experience and the body in a way such
that duplication is no more possible, and there is no more FPI, and
we can use the old identity thesis brain-mind.
But what exactly is a "sufficiently big infinity in both mind and
matter"?
We cannot define the notion of finite number, like we cannot define a
unique semantic for a sufficiently complex computational states, and
so the mind distirbutes on infinities of computations, like the
theorie on finite numbers, will get infinities of non standard
semantics.
But if we allow the induction axioms for all set of numbers, it can be
shown that we can defined univocally the naturel numbers, and their
standard semantics (assuming something more complex behind: set
theory, and making the notion of proof non effective).
So my making the brain a sufficiently complex infinite machine, using
Cantor hig infinities, it is not excluded that we cann attach
physically one mind to one machine and vice versa. Both must be
related to that infinity.
It is an an ad hoc move, but it means that we might conecive a non
computationalism theory of mind which bring back some 1-1 mind-brain
identity thesis. The reasoning I do with machine works also with
machine+oracle, and this can be used to say that the infinities needed
for non-comp and a identity thesis can be expected to be huge.
Technically: above kappa (a big cardinal which has some role in set
theory). Kappa is so big that the theory ZF + "kappa exists" can prove
the consistency of ZF.
By the way, the claim of Stathis's I was referring to was when he
said that, even assuming mechanism, a doubter could still ask (of
comp) 'why couldn't it all just be dumb arithmetic?'. It's a good
question. My rejoinder is that it could indeed just be dumb
arithmetic, but should that be the case, the consequence would be
the loss of the entire putative epistemology. Only the bare
'arithmetical ontology' would remain. No physics, no people, no
zombies, just numbers.
Yes. And the intersting things: theology, philosophy, physics,
nature, ... does not depend on the ontology, as long as it is Turing
universal.
IN fact comp can pehaps be better put in this way: There is a
universal machine, (a version of Church thesis, actially) + I am no
more than a universal machine myself. Physics become the study of how
machine's dream can glue together, cohere and decohere, etc.. Theology
is what machines can hope and fear (Truth on the machines).
If Dennett understood computationalism, and keep his reductionist
stance, he must eliminate consciousness, but also matter.
I guess it's easy to be blind to the fact that everything else,
beyond the basic ontological assumptions of comp, is essentially
epistemological.
Yes.
As I see it, the fundamental 'intensional' assumption of the comp
ontology is that nothing more than basic arithmetical relations are
required to emulate computation (which itself is closely related to
Turing's conceptualisation of a universal computational 'machine').
The basic 'extensional' assumption is then the UD, or more properly
its infinite trace UD*.
You don't need to assume the UD. It is part of the basic arithmetical
relation. If you assume your brain is Turing emulable, your
computations and computational states exists in arithmetical, for
exactly the same reason that even, odd, and prime numbers exists.
Beyond this basic ontology, ISTM, everything else that purportedly
'exists' is, provisionally, a question of epistemology.
Yes, except perhaps God (Arithmetical truth). It has both aspect.
That question can only be definitely settled if such putative
'knowledge' can be shown to be possessed, in actuality, by
whomsoever asserts a truthful claim to it. Otherwise, it is still
merely lurking as an abstract possibility in the infinite wastes of
mechanistic extension. The answer can only be found with reference
to truth; IOW what follows if one treats the analytic entailment of
such mechanistic 'possibilities' seriously *as an actuality*. This
is what makes truth-denial in this case catastrophically self-
defeating; any such defeat is tantamount to a total demolition of
the domain of reference of the entire putative epistemology.
I think so. That is why people invent concept like Matter of God, and
then use them to stop research, not to better formulating the
question. It is self-defeating and it needs argument by authority,
like insult or violence, to persist.
Bruno
David
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