On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 4:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 13 Mar 2015, at 17:57, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 13 Mar 2015, at 08:19, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 1:25 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> On 3/12/2015 1:21 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> >>> Not me. I'm the opposite, I was always confused by the idea that rocks >>> are not conscious. >>> >>> >>> If you ever have an operation, I suggest you check to see that your >>> anesthesiologist is not confused. >>> >> >> There's maybe a difference between being a conscious entity and being >> conscious of something. >> >> >> >> Does not consciousness entails the consciousness of at least one thing? >> >> Even before speculating about an entity (the future "little ego") >> consciousness seems reflexive to me, before verbalizing. >> >> It is the fixed point of the doubt. If we try to doubt everything, we >> find the indubitable but non justifiable knowledge of one thing. >> > > My intuitive impression (from some attempts at meditating, for example) is > that consciousness can exist in a completely self-referential state. But I > am not certain of this at all. I think this is inline with what you say > above, and with "cogito ergo sum". > > > That might be. Thomas Slezak, and myself, like to interpret Descartes in > arithmetic, so that a doubt of p, is defined by <>~p, and thus ~[]p, and > the fixed point is the famous Gödel sentence g, which is such that PA > proves (rationally believes) g <> ~[]g, which should be then, as far as PA > trust herself and her correctness, true and non believable/justifiable. > But to get the knowledge itself, which results from that, you need the > knower variant= [1]p = []p & p. That one has [1]p -> p, and just can't > doubt everything: he is the one living the fixed point of the doubt. > What does [1]p mean? Is it a reference to first person? > I think that meditation tries to diminish the dominance of the []p, and > meditation favor the "p", in the []p & p part of the knower. > I still don't fully grasp the []p & p thing. My naive interpretation would be that meditation favours []p, given that it sometimes generates a feeling of identification with the totality of things. > It leads to the problem that consciousness becomes a feature of the > arithmetical truth, only restricted by the little ego, owner of the body > and representations. We might need that God (Truth) is a knower itself, and > thus a sort of person, because only God would be conscious. > The word "God" still makes me cringe, but this is mostly because of organized religion. I plan on reading Plotinus soon and see if I change my mind. But I think I understand and agree with what you're saying, otherwise. > > > > > >> >> I think. >> >> You might say it is not a consciousness *of* something. I might have >> missed a nuance. >> > > I will clarify what I meant in a reply to Brent, to keep the discussion > linear. > > > Oops, sorry for bringing some non linearity, but that's because the black > hole in my basement is active again ... > The nice thing is that I just need to read your post to Brent to get the > clarification, and see if it matches the universal machine's explanation. > > Bruno > > Bruno > > > > > Telmo. > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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