On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: >> No it is not the same. In the MWI if John Clark says "tomorrow I will >> see the electron spin up" then tomorrow there is a clear way for Liz to >> determine if the prediction was correct or not because the the laws pf >> physics guarantee that Liz will find no ambitious in the meaning of the >> personal pronoun "I". >> > > > You mean, because I will also be duplicated. That's true. Nevertheless, > if the MWI is correct there is an ambiguity. I'm just not in a position to > experience it. >
True, you will not experience any ambiguity. And in a world without matter copying machines the laws of physics will also ensure that John Clark will not experience any ambiguity when Liz utters the personal pronoun "I". Human language need not be made more precise than the laws of physics, but it shouldn't be incompatible with them either. > the MWI implies that our idea of what we are is wrong, > It's not wrong it's just not the whole truth. What is? > > or at least inadequate. > Well... it's worked pretty adequately for thousands of years. > > if someone asks me whether I'm going to be at work tomorrow, I'd either > state my intention to be, or perhaps give a "probabalistic" answer > And tomorrow John Clark would be able to check and see if Liz's prediction turned out to be correct; but if right after making the prediction Liz stepped into a copying machine then nothing can be checked tomorrow or at any other time because the meaning of the prediction becomes an ambiguous muddle. > > Bruno's point is that *if* consciousness is an outcome of computation, > then it could in principle be duplicated. > Of course it can be duplicated! Is that even supposed to be controversial? If that was Bruno's only point this debate would have ended years ago, or would never even started. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
