> On 4 Apr 2015, at 3:14 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
>> On 03 Apr 2015, at 01:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 3 April 2015 at 01:06, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>> However, what you call "my" fuctionalism is a superset
>>>> of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain
>>>> with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device
>>>> animated by God, and preserve consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>>> ... making your functionalism trivial, if you excuse the straightness.
>>
>> It is not trivial because it makes this (if I may say so) rather
>> profound claim: that it is impossible even for God to make a device
>> that reproduces the observable function of the brain without also
>> reproducing any associated consciousness. Roger Penrose proposes that
>> the brain utilises non-computable physics and that therefore it is not
>> possible to reproduce either the observable function of the brain or
>> its consciousness using a digital computer.
>
> Yes, he defends non-comp (even non-quantum-comp, unlike Hamerov).
>
>
>
>> This is logically
>> consistent,
>
> OK, but this shows you agree that we can't prove comp. Only the
> generalisation your-functionalism.
Yes, comp is false if CT is false. But in that case you would be unable to make
a zombie either.
>> even if there is no actual evidence for it. John Searle,
>> on the other hand, believes that it is possible to reproduce the
>> observable function of the brain but that this would not necessarily
>> reproduce consciousness.
>
> Yes, it is another way to disbelieve in comp: believing in zombie.
>
>
>
>
>> Given that consciousness actually exists,
>> which entails that there is a difference between being conscious and
>> not being conscious, this is not logically consistent because it would
>> lead to partial zombies.
>
> Almost OK. What about someone who say that as long as 1/4 of its biological
> brain is organic he is fully conscious, but once more that 3/4 of the brain
> is digital, then it becomes a total zombie. In that case: no partial zombie.
> (just try to find a logical loophole ..., don't mind to much, I do agree with
> "Chalmers' fading qualia point").
There must then be some crucial indivisible component responsible for the flip
(for if it were not indivisible you could still make a partial zombie). It is
not inconceivable as a partial zombie is, but it is wildly implausible and
probably not consistent with the assumption that consciousness is a
naturalistic process in the brain.
>>>> It is my contention that
>>>> the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour
>>>> of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated
>>>> consciousness will follow necessarily.
>>>
>>>
>>> OK.
>>>
>>> I think you get close to "prove" the half of comp "yes doctor", as everybody
>>> agrees that we cannot prove Church thesis. (which does not mean we cannot
>>> give very powerful evidences for it).
>>>
>>> Then the proof of "yes doctor" use the fact that partial zombiness makes no
>>> sense, but I think that anosognosia can be used, notably if we believe in
>>> things like a "consciousness volume" (on which the anosognosia would bear
>>> on).
>>
>> I don't see how that could make sense. It is sufficient to consider
>> not special cases where the change is small or memory and cognition
>> are deficient, but a general case where the change in consciousness is
>> extreme and the person's cognition is intact. If you claim that it is
>> possible to radically change the "consciousness volume" without
>> someone noticing then I think that is tantamount to claiming that
>> consciousness does not exist.
>
> I agree.
>
>
>>
>>> The point is logical. Like in MGA, once we argue on reality, we can only
>>> present evidences, no proofs. The LHC has not prove the existence of the
>>> Higgs boson, nor does Mars Rover and its image prove the existence of Mars,
>>> or Apollo 9 the existence of the moon. They just give strong evidence.
>>>
>>> It would be on that strong sense of "proof" that my critics would bear on. A
>>> bit like Russell's critics on the MGA.
>>
>> I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the
>> world (although going from the general case of what I call
>> functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and
>> you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends
>> on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know
>> it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough
>> change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational
>> definition then I can find no meaning in the word "consciousness".
>
> You make your point. For some reason, I have still a little doubt, but I
> might need to just think a bit more. Some of my neurons make strike because
> they want me sleeping a bit more.
>
> My point is that we cannot prove comp, but I agree that even God cannot
> refute "your-functionalism".
> A perfect zombie does not make sense, but a non-comp person can of course
> decide that some or other person are zombie or have no soul, but then it is
> the usual insult of fear of the other. We might also get evidence against
> comp, like never succeeding in making an artificial brain. That could mean
> not that comp is false, but that the level might be low. In that case the
> personal with artificial brains would notice the difference, and some output
> would be different.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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