On 04 Apr 2015, at 01:29, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 06:33:52PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote:
The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the
argument if you assume that ontological reality
I guess you mean here: physical ontological reality (assuming it
exists).
If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia),
You really mean: robust physical ontology.
No, because the label physical should refer to what is phenomenal,
otherwise it doesn't have any meaning.
?
But then it seems you assume what we want to prove.
I have introduced the term "robust" only for the physical universe (be
it ontological or phenomenological). It is just what makes an entire
(never ending) physical universal dovetailing possible.
The Church Thesis (true by
assumption) shows that what is phenomenal cannot be ontological (or
noumenal, to borrow Kant's term), when the ontology is robust. That is
pretty much the whole point of UDA1-7.
What does it mean than an ontology is robust? UD* is "robust" in
arithmetic by definition.
The point of UDA1-7 is only that if we assume the physical universe
run a UD, then physics is a branch of arithmetic/computer science.
Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as
recordings can be fully counterfactually correct.
By adding the inert Klara? But then the physical role of the inert
Klara to produce consciousness to the movie is not Turing emulable,
and you stop assuming computationalism.
But in a robust ontology, the Klaras are no longer inert. They
cannot be.
I don't know what is a robust ontology. It looks that you mean by this
an everything ontology, or a many-world or many states or many
computations ontology.
But in that case the Klara are still inert in the relevant branch
where we do the reasoning. So I am not sure to see the relevance of
the remark here.
I can understand the role of Klara and counterfactual correctness
for the computation and behavior being correct hen change occur, but
how could they change the consciousness by being non present when
not needed?
If they are not needed, then some non-counterfactually correct
recordings can be conscious.
That is right, but that is the path to the reductio ad absurdum.
I don't have a strong opinion on this, as
the relevant recordings will be really very complex, but do suspect,
along with Brent, that full embodiment in an environment is needed,
along with counterfactual correctness.
?
Then they are no more recordings, but computation.
As I point out in my paper, that, physical supervenience, and the
MGA entails
a robust ontology (ie something like the Multiverse to exist).
You mean a primitively physical multiverse?
That would already be a quite non trivial result, but I don't see how
you get it.
That would be weird because it would prove that if can prove the
existence of primitive matter in arithmetic. I am a bit confused.
Cheers,
Bruno
Cheers
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