-----Original Message----- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Sunday, April 05, 2015 1:40 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Fast moves for nuclear development in Siberia
On 4/5/2015 11:09 AM, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote: > Actually compared with the Uranium fuel cycle the Thorium fuel cycle > is neutron poor, a LFTR produces enough neutrons to burn up 100% of > the Thorium but there isn't a lot of wiggle room, however this is an > advantage not a disadvantage. If somebody tried to secretly siphon off > some of the U233 produced in a reactor to make a bomb the reactor > would simply stop and it would be hard to keep that secret, also fewer > neutrons means less damage to the equipment, you already don't have to > worry about the most important maintenance problem that a conventional > reactor has, cracks in the solid fuel rods caused by neutrons, because a LFTR > has no solid fuel rods, it's fuel is a liquid and you can't crack a liquid. The reason LFTRs have been touted as proliferation resistant is that the U233 is mixed with U232 which makes its use in a weapons almost impossible. But the proliferation problem for a LFTR is that Proactinium can be chemically remove from the cycle, which prevents the accumulation of U232. Then the U233 can be siphoned off and used. A 2GW LFTR is expected to produce about 60Kg of excess U233 per year; enough for 7 to 8 nuclear weapons. So the proliferation resistance is exaggerated. I agree, and have mentioned this in previous threads on this. LFTRs are not proliferation proof, when the Proactinium is chemically removed out of the circulating molten salt fluid, before it becomes transmuted by an extra neutron absorption into the isotope that yields U-232 (it's highly radioactive decay product) Segregating out the Proactinium and letting it decay to the useful U-233 is also important for optimal reactor functioning and so is something that can be expected to occur in regular operating procedures. The issue of proliferation is one that needs a political solution -- ultimately -- technical prevention can only endure for as long as the technology remains out of reach. Increasing numbers of nations are obtaining the required technical, engineering levels of expertise needed. The nuclear cat is out of the bag. The way to reduce the risk of nuclear war is through political means; reducing (and channeling) the completion & tensions between the increasing number of polities that have amassed the necessary industrial, technical and scientific knowhow in order to indigenously master these processes. Chris Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
